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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, three closely related issues of capital account liberalization in China have been 
studied. They are the order of capital account liberalization, the choice of exchange rate regimes 
and one possible side-effect of liberalization—currency substitution.  
 
The principal argument of capital account liberalization is how to execute such policies. From 
three different aspects, government finance, domestic money & capital market and the foreign 
related economy, and comparing with other developing countries’ experience, we conclude that 
it is still not advisable for China to take the final step—to liberalize its capital account. Based on 
87 countries’ exchange rate arrangement in three separate years, a Logit model is used to 
examine the determinants of choosing the appropriate exchange rate regimes. The empirical 
prediction suggests China’s current fixed foreign exchange arrangement is not compatible with 
its macroeconomic variables. In the last part, the issue of currency substitution is being examined 
by the cointegration and error correction methodology. The empirical results indicate the 
existence of currency substitution in China, thus a more precautious liberalization process should 
be taken. Our study of the capital account liberalization points out some economic shortcomings 
in China, and gives out some brief policy suggestions.  
 
 
[Key Words]: Capital Account, China, Currency Substitution, Developing Countries,  
Economic Liberalization, Exchange Rate. 
 




Capital account liberalization and the choice of exchange rate regimes remain the most 
controversial and least understood macroeconomic policies of today, especially after the 
nightmarish financial crises that hit the East Asian countries in the late 1990s. Our study 
examines the intricacies of capital account liberalization and exchange rate regime choices in the 
context of China, the largest developing country and the largest economy in transition. 
 
One classical theory in international economics states that the more liberalized a capital market is, 
the more efficient it will allocate capital, which in turn enhances productivity and output of the 
economy. When we consider the problem of capital account liberalization, the principal 
argument is not whether to liberalize the capital account, but when and how to execute such 
policies (McKinnon, 1993). China has already opened its current account since 1996, and this 
policy change greatly expedites foreign trade. Many economic researchers and political 
observers advocate further economic liberalization in China. So the question comes to the fore. Is 
the country also ready to open its capital account now? If yes, what should be the proper process? 
If no, what does it still lack of? This question will be studied in this paper by comparing a set of 
macroeconomic indicators of China with those of other Asian and Latin American developing 
countries. The capital accounts of these nations either are open or were once open. 
 
The choice of exchange regimes will be another critical problem immediately after capital 
account liberalization. One nation will have many choices between a flexible arrangement and a 
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fixed arrangement. Should China continue to peg its currency to the US dollar with assumed 
future free capital mobility? Is a flexible exchange rate regime a better option for China? Based 
on 87 countries’ exchange rate arrangement in three separate years (1990, 1995 and 2000), a 
Logit model is used to examine the determinants of choosing the appropriate exchange rate 
regimes. The predictions for China are then analyzed. 
 
One concern for full economic liberalization in developing countries is the problem of currency 
substitution. It is one of the side-effects after a country removes its capital control. Ramirezs-
Rojas (1985) and Canto and Nickelsburg (1987) document this problem in some Latin American 
countries. Will this happen to China too? Both economists and policy-makers in China raised 
this consideration, like Jiang (1999). He estimates that the foreign currency deposits in China 
only accounted for about 5 to 6 percent of the total deposits from 1993 to 1996, so he concludes 
that the problem of currency substitution is not severe in China. In this study, we’ll estimate the 
demand for foreign currency in China by using cointegration and error correction methodology.  
 
All the three aspects mentioned above, namely capital account liberalization, foreign exchange 
choice in an open economy and the impact of liberalization, are strung by one core economic 
concept—economic liberalization. We shall not investigate them separately. Instead, a 
comprehensive research is needed to understand them more precisely. This intrigues our interest 
of a study on this topic. 
 
The reminder of the thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 discusses the theory 
of capital account liberalization order and its application to China. Chapter 3 provides an 
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empirical model on exchange arrangement determination. The problem of currency substitution 
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Chapter Two:  
Capital Account Liberalization  
 
2.1. A Brief Introduction to the Modern Chinese Economy 
 
Based on their political regimes, all socialist countries chose centrally planned economic systems, 
symbolized with foreign trade barriers and frequent domestic economic interventions. The major 
logic behind these policies is that a market-oriented system could cause resources waste and 
income inequality in the society. In the 1950s and 1960s, the socialist countries apparently grew 
very fast; in particular, technological achievements of the former Soviet Union were impressive. 
However, all these countries suffered from economic stagnancy subsequently, and in the late 
1980s they began to restructure their economies, either gradually or drastically.  
 
Since the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, it had experienced three decades of 
centrally planned economic development. Under this repressive economic regime, all resources 
and final output were distributed by the government; prices did not reflect the equilibrium 
relationship of supply and demand. Little foreign trade was allowed. There was even a period of 
time when domestic trade was entirely forbidden. Banks and other financial institutions were 
established for the sole purpose of supporting the government’s economic plan. The central bank, 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC), was only a subordinate body of the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF).  The central government always financed its deficit through issuing more currency. 
Furthermore, at that time China was still far from establishing a capital market. There was no 
securities market and treasury bonds were non-tradable.  
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During the 1950s, China’s economic achievement was significant, especially in the first half 
decade. The average annual economic growth rate for the period 1953-1959 was 11.5% (see 
Figure 2.1). During the 1960s, China experienced two recessions: 1960-1962 and 1966-1968. 
However, these two recessions are mainly due to political factors (i.e. Great Leap Forward for 
1960-1962 and Cultural Revolution for 1966-1968). 
 
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
Notes: * Due to the lack of inflation indices, data in this graph are calculated at current prices, 
thus the real economic growth could be lower than these figures. 
 
Not until the end of 1978, did China find a plausible way to stimulate its economy.  Since then, 
China has implemented a series of the well-known ‘Reform and Open Policies’. It liberalized the 
prices of commodities and services; aimed to establish an independent central bank; allowed the 
firms to decide productions by themselves; established two stock exchanges 1 ; encouraged 
foreign trade; and other market-oriented policies. The medicines displayed their effect soon. 
China’s GDP grew from 362 billion yuan in 1978 to 8,940 billion yuan (at current prices) in 
                                                
1 The two stock exchanges are Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), which was opened on 19 December 1990 and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which was opened on 3 July 1991. 
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2000 and the average annual real GDP growth rate from 1980 to 2000 was 9.66%; GDP per 
capita also strikingly increased from 379 yuan to 7,078 yuan (at current prices). Foreign export 
sharply mounted up to USD 267 billion in 2001, about 26 times larger than that in 1978. The 
world-shaking economic achievement of China also can be showed by other figures, like direct 
foreign investment (DFI). Table 2.1 summarizes some major indicators of China. 









      DFI2     
(Billion USD) 
Exchange    
Rate3 
1955 91.00 150.00 - - -
1960 145.70 218.00 - - 2.46
1965 171.61 240.00 4.25 - 2.46
1970 225.27 275.00 4.59 - 2.46
1975 299.73 327.00 14.75 - 1.86
1980 451.78 460.00 38.14 - 1.50
1985 896.44 855.00 69.60 4.65 2.94
1990 1,854.79 1,634.00 115.44 10.29 4.78
1995 5,847.81 4,854.00 280.86 48.13 8.35
2000 8,940.36 7,078.00 474.29 59.36 8.28
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001).  
Notes: 1. Sum of Export and Import.  
           2. Direct Foreign Investment, Total Amount of Foreign Capital Actually Used. 
           3. Yuan per USD, Period Average. 
 
In 1996, China accepted Article VIII of the IMF agreement, which facilitated foreign trade—
trade companies can exchange their renminbi into foreign currencies for their trade transactions; 
it also allows foreign investors to buy and sell foreign currency denominated equities (B-share 
stocks in SHSE and SZSE were open to foreign investors and overseas Chinese only before 
February 19, 2001; and there are also some companies listed on stock exchanges in Hong Kong, 
New York and Singapore). Many scholars and businessmen expect to see a more financially 
open China after its entry into WTO. Is China ready to liberalize its capital account and to allow 
the full convertibility of renminbi now? If yes, what should be a proper liberalization process; 
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what accompanying policies should the government adopt? If no, what does China still lack of? 
These are the main topics that will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
To get a persuasive conclusion, we will compare China’s experience with those of other 
developing economies to locate China’s corresponding stage in the economic liberalization 
process. During last few decades, tens of developing countries have liberalized their financial 
markets, and opening their capital account is regarded as one of the key steps in the process2. 
Some of them enjoyed a smooth transition, while others suffered from it. In our study, we choose 
ten Latin American and Asian developing countries as the benchmark of this liberalization 
process. They are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 












                                                
2 Appendix A reports some major changes in those countries’ liberalization process. 
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2.2. Literature Review and the Order of Capital Account Liberalization 
 
Capital account liberalization remains one of the most controversial macroeconomic policy 
options available to emerging market countries. Some industrial countries enjoyed a more 
efficient allocation of capital, in part, due to the opening of their capital accounts. It is natural to 
hypothesize that less wealthy countries can benefit even more, as capital allocation in these 
countries is less efficient than that in industrial countries. However, financial crises in Asia, 
Latin America and Russia have shifted the attention from when countries should liberalize to if 
they should do so. In an influential article, Bhagwati (1998) states “substantial gains [from 
capital account liberalization] have been asserted, not demonstrated…”. Instead, liberalization 
attracts speculative hot money and the possibility of financial crises (Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 
2002). Thus, many empirical studies have been done on examining the cross-country effects of 
capital liberalization recently. Edison et al (2002) reviews issues involved in assessing the 
relationship between capital account liberalization and economic growth. They provide some 
support for a positive effect of capital account liberalization on growth, especially for developing 
countries. Klein (2003) finds an inverted U-shape relationship between responsiveness of growth 
to capital account openness and income per capita. Middle-income countries benefit significantly 
from capital account openness; and moreover neither rich nor poor countries exhibit statistically 
significant positive effects. Henry (2003) finds three effects happen when emerging economies 
open their stock markets to foreign investors: the cost of capital falls, capital stocks increase 
more and the growth rate of output per worker rises. Thus the view that capital account 
liberalization brings no real benefits seems untenable. 
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Johnston et al (1997) studies the experiences of capital account liberalization in Chile, Indonesia, 
Korea and Thailand. Their paper focuses on the interrelationship between capital account 
liberalization, domestic financial sector reforms, and the design of monetary and exchange rate 
policy. It concludes that capital account liberalization should be approached as an integrated part 
of comprehensive reform strategies and should be paced with the implementation of appropriated 
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies.  
 
McKinnon (1993) argues that the principal question is not whether to liberalize the capital 
account, but the process of financial liberalization—how fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange 
policies are sequenced is of critical importance. Government cannot, and perhaps should not, 
undertake all liberalizing measures simultaneously. Instead, there is an optimal order of 
economic liberalization, which may vary for different economies depending on their initial 
conditions, but some common characteristics should be highlighted. He colludes an optimum 
sequencing of financial policies in the transition from centralized controls repressing domestic 
and foreign trade to a full-fledged market economy.  
 
First prerequisite is to balance the government’s finance. Before inflation can feasibly or safely 
be phased out, and before the capital market is open for free borrowing and lending, the first and 
most obvious need is to balance the government’s finance. Fiscal control should precede 
financial liberalization. Only with a broad tax base can the government raises sufficient revenue 
to avoid inflation without resorting to arbitrary ex post seizures of enterprise profits or personal 
property, which result in the adverse incentive effects that currently bedevil the socialist 
economies (Litwack, 1992). In former Soviet Union countries, one problem is that they 
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privatized those former state-owned enterprises too quickly. As the profits from those enterprises 
are the major source of revenue for the governments, this rapid change greatly deteriorates the 
government finance. Successful liberalizing governments must levy broadly based, but low-rate, 
taxes on both enterprises and households.  
 
The second step is to open the domestic capital market so that depositors receive, and borrowers 
pay, market-determined interest rates. But unrestricted borrowing and lending among 
decentralized enterprises and households can only proceed satisfactorily once the price level is 
stabilized and fiscal deficits are eliminated. Without price-level stability, unpredictable volatility 
in real interest rates makes unrestricted domestic borrowing and lending by deposit-taking banks 
too risky. As in most transition countries, domestic interest rates are not decided by the market 
mechanism, depositors often only can get negative interest rates in the real term. Thus currency 
substitution could be a severe problem, just like the situation in Argentina in recent years. One 
prerequisite to having a rational interest rate is to have enough independent participants in the 
money and capital markets. However, the authorities should move cautiously, perhaps waiting 
for some years before establishing independent commercial banks that are only indirectly 
regulated by the central bank. Indeed, those former state-owned banks should deal with their bad 
loans before privatization.  
 
And the third step is to liberalize the foreign trade before the capital account liberalization. 
Freeing foreign commodity trade should proceed in parallel with the decontrol of prices in the 
domestic trade of goods and services. One significant symbol in less developed countries is 
quotas and other direct administrative controls on exports and imports. In the optimum order of 
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liberalizing foreign trade, transitional countries may begin by converting their implicit quota 
restrictions into explicit tariffs. Once formally codified, the tariffs can be reduced gradually 
toward zero over a pre-announced five- or ten-year adjustment period. After this well-defined 
commercial policy is in place, free currency convertibility for exporting or importing on current 
account can be maintained. However, this rationalization of foreign trade policy need not warrant 
extending full foreign exchange convertibility to capital-account transactions.  
 
Only when domestic borrowing and lending take place freely at equilibrium rates of interest and 
the domestic inflation is curbed so that depreciation in the exchange rate is unnecessary, are the 
arbitrage conditions right for allowing free international capital mobility. Otherwise, the 
premature elimination of exchange controls on foreign capital flows could lead to unwarranted 
capital flight or an unwarranted build-up of foreign indebtedness or both. Thus, free foreign 
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2.3. Government Fiscal Strength 
 
Based on McKinnon’s theory, only with a broad base of taxation can the government raise 
sufficient revenue to avoid inflation without resorting to issuing more currency. It is not 
surprising that a sound domestic fiscal environment should be reached before opening the whole 
economy to a more capricious world market. If we look at the balance of China’s government 
budget (see Figure 2.2), we find that along with the economic takeoff it also experienced a sharp 
increase in government deficit, especially in the 1990s.  
 
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
 
This huge deficit was mainly caused by two reasons. One is from the source of government 
revenue. Because of the privatization process of those state owned enterprises (SOE), the 
Chinese government gradually lost revenue from those enterprises. From 1950-1977, an average 
of 48% of total revenue came from those SOEs’ profits. But since economic reform in 1978, this 
share continued to decrease until its disappearance in 1994 (Figure 2.3). Thus the government 
revenue became much more relied on taxes. Due to its fragile taxation system, tax evasion in 
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China is a very severe problem. This can be shown by the total revenue to GDP ratio. Since 1978, 
this ratio has gradually decreased from 31.2% to 15% in 2000 (Figure 2.4). This shows that the 
government’s fiscal control has deteriorated after the economic reform.  
 
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
 
 
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
 
Another explanation of the huge deficit is the increasingly large government expenditure: the 
total government expenditure in 2000 was 1,588 billion yuan, more than 14 times of that in 1978. 
The government increased its expenditure mainly for two uses.  One of the uses was subsidizing 
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the loss making SOEs, especially those state owned banks and other financial institutions. After 
Asian financial crisis, Chinese authority realized the importance of a well-developed financial 
system. To solve the bulky bad loans in the banking system, the Chinese government established 
four asset management companies to take over a large part of their debts3, and the Chinese 
government recapitalized the four major banks, through issuance of treasury bond of 270 billion 
yuan, raising their capital adequacy ratio to 8 per cent4. This was a heavy burden to the central 
government. Another use of the government expenditure was to invest in infrastructure. Because 
of deflation and low domestic consumption, the government wanted to stimulate the economy by 
increasing government investment. In the past few years, China started several big construction 
projects, including the Three Gorges Project, which will solely cost more than 200 billion yuan 
in the next 20 years. From 1978 to 2000, the annual growth rate of government expenditure was 
one per cent higher than the government revenue. This actually answers why the deficit was 
widening.  
 
Government deficit is not a unique problem for China, other countries also have budget deficits 
(see Table 2.2). In the past 20 years, of all the countries examined only Singapore and Chile, 
which are usually referred as paragons in economic development in Asia and Latin America 
respectively5, have surplus on average (see Figure 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and Table 2.2).  
                                                
3 No precise figure has been reported, but a widely acceptable estimate is more than 3,000 billion yuan, that is 25% 
of banks’ total assets. For instance, “According to conservative estimation, the proportion of non-performing-loans 
is now above 30 per cent”. (Huang, 1999) 
4 The average capital adequacy ratio of the four pillar state-owned-banks in China was only 4.4 per cent by the end 
of 1999, lower than 8 per cent required by the Bank of International Settlement and China's own commercial bank 
law. (Huang, 1999) 
5 If we spread the time span to all years when data are available, then only Singapore has positive average. 
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Data Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (2001) 
 
 






Figure 2.5.1 Ratio of Government Balance to GDP (1) (1980-2000) 














Figure 2.5.2 Ratio of Government Balance to GDP (2) (1980-2000) 
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Table 2.2 Government Balance to GDP Ratio (1960-2000) 
In Percentage 
 
Country 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Avg. 80-00 
China         -2.80 0.25 -0.80 -0.99 -2.79 -1.04 
Argentina           -5.27 -0.33 -0.55 -2.40 -2.12 
Chile       0.14 5.41 -2.29 0.80 2.58 0.14 0.79 
Mexico         -3.04 -7.55 -2.69 -0.53 -1.26 -4.12 
Peru             -8.10 -1.12 -2.01 -2.31 
Korea 0.99 -0.14 -0.77 -1.97 -2.25 -1.16 -0.68 0.27   -0.70 
Malaysia 1.93 -5.45 -3.91 -8.51 -6.95 -5.68 -2.89 0.84   -4.50 
Philippines 0.06 -1.29 0.14 -1.19 -1.39 -1.95 -3.45 0.58 -4.12 -2.12 
Singapore   -2.71 3.46 2.12 0.39 1.53 9.77 13.48 11.32 7.35 
Thailand 0.13 -0.62 -3.67 -2.44 -3.87 -3.69 4.90 3.22 -2.20 -0.35 
Data Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (2001) 
Notes: Negative values stand for deficit, and positive means surplus. 
 
Compared with other countries, China’s 20-year average deficit-to-GDP ratio is still moderate. 
But more attention should be paid to the trend of this series. Chinese government successfully 
maintained a balanced budget before 1990, but since then it has quickly deteriorated (some 
plausible explanations of this change were mentioned).  
 
Fiscal balance is the combined results of two sides: government revenue and expense. To 
precisely understand those deficit numbers, we should diagnose the problem from both sides.  
 
Revenue-to-GDP ratio has frequently been looked as a criterion of the government fiscal power. 
Then, how is China’s government fiscal strength, compared with other major developing 
countries in Latin America and Asia? Figure 2.6 clearly shows that Chinese government’s 
revenue as a percentage of the economy is below most of other 9 countries (Brazil is excluded 
due to a lack of data) for the period of 1980-2000. China’s tax system is not well established yet6. 
The share of government revenue partly reflects fiscal policy effectiveness. It is not surprising to 
                                                
6 See some introductions of China’s tax system in Appendix B. 
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find that Latin American countries’ revenue-GDP ratios were relatively lower than those of their 
Asian counterparts, and this is in line with their debt problems in the 80s and 90s. 
 
Data Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (2001) 
 
One interesting phenomenon is that in many developing countries, the ratio of government 
revenue to output is decreasing during its quick expanding period, which means revenue 
increases lag the whole economy. This can be examined by a simple regression.  
 
(2.1)                                                itiiit GDPaCREV +=  
 
where REVit is country i’s ratio of government revenue to GDP in the year t; 
           C is a constant; 
           and GDPit is country i’s gross domestic products in year t. 
 
Parameter a captures the effect of GDP’s change on government revenue: if it is negative, we 
can say the government’s fiscal influence deteriorates when the economy expands. Below are the 
results for some selected countries. 
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Table 2.3 Estimation of the GDP impact on Revenue-GDP ratio 
 
Country C t-statistic a t-statistic Adj.Rsq. Time-Span 
China 4.493 27.23 -0.221 -10.21 0.83 1979-2000 
Chile 3.565 54.55 -0.040 -4.93 0.45 1972-2000 
Mexico 2.884 34.04 -0.012 -1.86 0.11 1980-2000 
Korea 2.386 23.94 0.043 4.91 0.51 1975-1997 
Malaysia 2.058 12.45 0.096 6.21 0.49 1960-1999 
Philippines 2.230 44.70 0.074 8.17 0.60 1957-2000 
Singapore 1.466 10.89 0.178 13.50 0.83 1963-2000 
Thailand 2.165 59.65 0.083 13.79 0.79 1950-2000 
Notes: All series are used in their log forms. Only those countries with more than 
20 years’ data are selected.  
 
If we interpret the results in the simplest way, with an increase in output, most countries’ (5 out 
of 8) revenue to output ratios also increases, except for China, Chile and Mexico. And China 
even faces the most severe situation (the absolute value of parameter a is bigger than other two 
exceptional counterparts). If we categorize these 7 countries (excluding China) into two groups: 
Latin America and Asia, we may interestingly find that the average value of parameter a in Latin 
American countries are negative, while Asian countries are positive. This could be a reasonable 
explanation why Latin American countries have more severe debt problems during the last 20 
years. Those governments lost their control of taxation. This is a very important guideline for 
China. Before fully liberalizing its economy, the country should ensure that it has enough fiscal 
power to influence the economy. China’s figure (-0.221) is a quite dangerous number, especially 
compared with its Asian neighbors. It shows that though the country in generally enjoys fast 
development in the past two decades; the government doesn’t gain its proportional benefit. This 
could be partly explained by China’s open policy in favor of foreign investors. In order to attract 
more overseas investors, the government gives them tax franchise (usually profit tax exemption 
for the first two years and many other privileges in the consecutive years). Such policy is fairly 
effective in attracting investments, besides other fundamental advantages in China (low wages 
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and huge market). But the prescription also has side-effect. The joint-venture companies grow 
extremely fast—it accounted for more than half of China’s total exports in recent years. But 
many of them still enjoy the tax franchise; their tax burden is much lighter than SOE’s. However, 
the authority has seen this problem, and is making progress to set a uniform tax system for all 
kinds of enterprises.  
 
Revenue is only one side of the government’s budget, what is the cause of fiscal deficit? Is it 
because of the low revenue or too high expense? Following equations should be noticed. 
 
(2.2)                                              itiiit REVbCDS 11 +=  
 
(2.3)                                              itiiit EXPbCDS 22 +=  
 
where DSit is country i’s ratio of fiscal deficit or surplus to GDP in year t; 
           REVit is country i’s ratio of government revenue to GDP in year t; 
           EXPit is country i’s  ratio of government expense to GDP in year t; 
           C1 and C2 are constants. 
            
We estimate b1 and b2 for all sample countries to see which factor is more important to a specific 
country. Results are reported in the Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Comparison of Revenue and Expense influence on Fiscal Balance 
 
  Country b1 t-stat Adj.Rsq. b2 t-stat Adj.Rsq. Time-Span 
China -0.059 -1.25 0.026 -0.092 -2.27 0.165 1979-2000 
Chile -0.107 -0.74 -0.016 -0.379 -4.70 0.429 1972-2000 
Mexico -1.139 -1.06 0.006 -0.919 -22.69 0.962 1980-2000 
Korea 0.153 2.85 0.142 0.122 1.11 0.005 1954-1999 
Malaysia -0.357 -1.95 0.067 -0.532 -8.87 0.666 1960-1999 
Philippines 0.044 0.51 -0.018 -0.108 -1.48 0.027 1957-2000 
Singapore 0.594 6.42 0.520 -0.142 -0.73 -0.013 1963-2000 
Thailand 0.675 5.85 0.400 -0.566 -3.68 0.201 1950-2000 
Notes: All series are used in percentages. Only countries with more than 20 years of 
data are selected. 
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A very interesting finding is that most countries have only one significant value for either b1 or 
b2, and the only exceptions are the Philippines and Thailand (where the Philippines has no 
significant parameter and Thailand has two). What’s more, all the significant parameters have 
reasonable signs (b1 is negative and b2 is positive). If we exclude the Philippines and Thailand 
from the analysis, we may further notice that those countries which have significant values of 
parameter b1, Korea and Singapore, are the only two countries have fiscal surplus or minor 
deficit; the four countries have significant values of parameter b2 all suffered non-neglectable 
deficits in the estimation time period. This result suggests that if a country has fiscal deficit, it is 
more generally because of the indulgent government spending, not the low revenue; contrarily, if 
it has surplus, it is mainly because of its huge revenue, not low expenses.  
 
All the above analysis on fiscal problems brings us some conclusions and policy suggestions for 
China.  
 
1. China’s fiscal position has been deteriorating in the last two decades. Though it is not 
worse than other similar developing countries (9 Asian and Latin American countries), 
the trend is frustrating. And it has already reached the critical alert line of 3% as of the 
budget deficit to GDP ratio. 
 
2. Chinese government gradually loses the control of economy through fiscal policies as its 
revenue to output ratio decrease continuously. 
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3. The Chinese government should not neglect its unrestricted spending, while 
simultaneously strengthening the taxation system is also important, though this could be 
contradictive with other economic policies to expedite the growth of output. But this is an 
essential prerequisite before fully liberalize the economy. Otherwise, debt problem will 
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2.4. Domestic Money and Capital Market 
 
McKinnon (1993) observed, “Generally, those countries that succeeded in stabilizing their price 
levels and real exchange rates, while maintaining moderately positive real yields on bank 
deposits in an open capital market, show a higher productivity of physical capital than those 
financial systems remained ‘repressed’.” Well-established and smoothly operated money and 
capital markets are exclusively important in the process of economic liberalization. 
 
Before 1979, China only had one major bank, PBC. It acted as both central bank and commercial 
bank. And other financial institutions were also scarce. So we can say there wasn’t any financial 
market then. Things have changed rapidly since the 1980s. Now, in the banking sector, besides 
four major state-owned banks, there also exist 10 national commercial banks, hundreds of 
municipal banks and rural credit cooperatives, and of course new-entering or re-entering foreign 
banks. In the securities markets, China has two stock exchanges, namely SHSE and SZSE, with 
more than 1200 listed companies together. Though the financial markets haven’t been fully 
liberalized and state-owned institutions are still the major players, other types of participants 
grow up quickly and have already taken a certain share of the pie. A detailed analysis will be 
conducted from two aspects: money market and capital market. 
 
How does China perform, compared with other developing countries? One standard to measure 
the development of the money market is M3/GDP ratio. Table 2.5 presents this ratio for sample 
countries in selected years. 
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Table 2.5 M3/GDP Ratios (1975-2000) 
 
Countries 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Mean 
1975-2000 
China   0.367 0.554 0.801 1.038 1.521 0.819
Argentina     0.177 0.115 0.203 0.320 0.218
Chile 0.147 0.286 0.410 0.408 0.404 0.470 0.362
Mexico 0.318 0.318 0.276 0.243 0.315 0.229 0.292
Peru     0.211 0.248 0.207 0.321 0.236
Mean Ratio of Latin American Countries 0.277
Korea 0.331 0.362 0.405 0.558 0.753 0.982 0.550
Malaysia 0.712 0.806 1.150   1.156 1.322 1.223
Philippines 0.225 0.291 0.313 0.370 0.568 0.665 0.401
Singapore 0.729 0.834 1.086 1.258 1.185 1.154 1.080
Thailand 0.344 0.385 0.567 0.708 0.815 1.111 0.649
Mean Ratio of Asian Countries (excluding China) 0.781
Data Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (2001) 
Notes: Following the International Financial Statistics, M3 is defined as money (line 
34)+quasi-money (line 35)+deposits outside commercial banks (line 45). M3 is a 
stock tabulated as of June 10 for each calendar year, whereas GDP is the flow of 
output for that year. 
 
From Table 2.5, we find that on average Asian countries have much higher M3/GDP ratios than 
Latin American countries. This is mainly because Asian residents generally have a higher 
propensity to save. Surprisingly, China’s M3/GDP is among the highest in year-average (only 
below Malaysia and Singapore), and its 2000’s value is even the highest one among all sample 
countries, though its development history is the shortest. One plausible explanation to this 
phenomenon is that China has the largest proportion of farmers, about 2/3 of the whole 
population. Because of lacking knowledge and instant information access, those people have 
limited investment channels. They are more likely to deposit their money in the banks. Thus, 
banks have plenty of deposit supply from the countryside. Another reason is about the social 
security system. Most Chinese people don’t have enough insured funds when they face with 
illness or when they retire; hence it is not strange that they are more likely to put their money in 
the banks to cover accidental expenses. This high M3/GDP ratio is beneficial to a country, 
especially at the beginning stage of its economic takeoff. Developing countries usually are lack 
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of funds, this high money stock ensures that borrowers can get enough funds from banks if their 
business is well-rated by the banks. But a major problem in Chinese money market is that the 
interest rate is not decided by the market power, furthermore the banks almost have no legal right 
to modify the interest rate with respective to different clients. A non-market-decided rate is 
inefficient, as it cannot rationalize the use of capital. 
 
We cannot blindly judge that China’s money market is quite advanced in the group of 
developing countries only based on the M3/GDP ratio. We suggest M3/M1 should also be 
noticed (see Table 2.6). M1 is the money base in an economy, and it is defined as currency in 
circulation plus demand deposits. And M3 is a much larger measure of money supply, the ratio 
of these two measures can be regarded as a proxy for the depth of an economy’s money market. 
A higher M3/M1 ratio means a more efficient market mechanism of the money amplification 
process. It is logical to find that in general Asian countries have a higher M3/M1 than those of 
their Latin American partners (those selected Asian countries have relatively stable political 
situation, and larger size of financial markets). In this scenario, we can see China has the lowest 
ratio. This partly explains that China’s high M3/GDP is not because of its well-developed money 
market system, instead it is mainly because the monetary authority, PBC, issues more currency 
than other countries. This certifies the infantility of the Chinese money market, and the low 
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Table 2.6 M3/M1 Ratios (1975-2000) 
 
Countries 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Mean 
1975-2000 
China   1.454 1.614 2.093 2.631 2.493 2.057
Argentina     2.685 2.583 3.152 4.584 3.251
Chile 1.749 3.044 5.424 5.129 4.520 4.866 4.597
Mexico 2.859 2.954 3.759 3.559 3.850 2.790 3.383
Peru     2.005 1.908 3.336 2.845 2.524
Mean Ratio of Latin American Countries 3.439
Korea 2.865 3.593 4.357 6.273 7.310 10.906 6.488
Malaysia 3.656 4.404 6.310   4.044 5.608 5.092
Philippines 2.503 3.147 4.869 4.289 5.562 5.623 4.698
Singapore 2.808 3.411 4.812 5.479 5.505 5.547 4.951
Thailand 3.004 3.570 6.979 7.911 8.787 7.964 7.042
Mean Ratio of Asian Countries (excluding China) 5.654
Data Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (2001) 
 
On the capital market side, China has already been the second largest stocks market (by market 
value) in Asia, only after Japan. By the end of 2002, there were 1224 companies listed on the 
SHSE and SZSE, with total market capitalization of 3833 billion yuan and 68.8 million investors. 
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Table 2.7 Market Capitalizations in Selected Developing Countries (1980-2000) 
US$ Millions, End-of-Period Level 
 
Markets  1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
China Market Capitalization       42,055 330,703 
 
Negotiable Market 
Capitalization1    11,232 99,222 
 Percentage to EM2    2.2 10.8 
  Percentage to GDP       6.0 33.4 
Argentina Market Capitalization 3,864 2,037 3,268 37,783 83,887 
 Percentage to EM 4.5 1.8 0.5 2.0 2.7 
  Percentage to GDP 2.5 3.1 2.3 14.6 29.6 
Brazil Market Capitalization 9,160 42,768 16,354 147,636 227,962 
 Percentage to EM 10.6 37.1 2.7 7.7 7.4 
  Percentage to GDP 3.8 19.2 3.5 21.0 42.3 
Chile Market Capitalization 9,400 2,012 13,645 73,860 68,228 
 Percentage to EM 10.9 1.7 2.3 3.9 2.2 
  Percentage to GDP 34.1 12.2 45.0 113.3 93.4 
Mexico Market Capitalization 12,994 3,815 32,725 90,694 154,044 
 Percentage to EM 15.1 3.3 5.4 4.7 5.0 
  Percentage to GDP 6.7 2.1 12.5 25.0 32.0 
Peru Market Capitalization   760 812 11,795 13,392 
 Percentage to EM  0.7 0.1 0.6 0.4 
  Percentage to GDP     2.8 22.0 25.9 
Korea Market Capitalization 3,829 7,381 110,594 181,955 308,534 
 Percentage to EM 4.4 6.4 18.3 9.5 10.0 
  Percentage to GDP 6.2 7.9 43.8 37.2 76.0 
Malaysia Market Capitalization 12,395 16,229 48,611 222,729 145,445 
 Percentage to EM 14.4 14.1 8.0 11.7 4.7 
  Percentage to GDP 50.7 51.9 110.2 250.3 183.8 
Philippines Market Capitalization 3,478 669 5,927 58,859 48,105 
 Percentage to EM 4.0 0.6 1.0 3.1 1.6 
  Percentage to GDP 10.7 2.2 13.4 79.4 63.2 
Singapore Market Capitalization 24,418 11,069 34,308 148,004 198,407 
 Percentage to EM 28.4 9.6 5.7 7.7 6.5 
  Percentage to GDP 208.3 62.6 93.4 178.5 239.4 
Thailand Market Capitalization 1,206 1,856 23,896 141,507 58,365 
 Percentage to EM 1.4 1.6 4.0 7.4 1.9 
  Percentage to GDP 3.7 4.8 28.0 84.2 47.6 
All 
Emerging 
Markets Market Capitalization 86,125 115,224 604,420 1,910,688 3,073,871 
World Market Capitalization 2,738,081 4,636,480 9,399,659 17,772,303 36,030,809 
Data Source: Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, IFC, various years.  
                     China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
Notes: 1. In China, only negotiable shares can be freely traded in the stock 
exchange, other two types of shares (state-owned and legal-person-
owned shares), can not be traded in the open market. 
            2. EM stands for Emerging Markets, which are included in IFC’s report. 
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Considering the size of its economy, China’s stock market is still quite small, though its absolute 
market value is the highest among the 11 countries, which accounts for 10.8% of total emerging 
markets in 1999. The market capitalization to GDP ratio of China is only 33.4% in 1999, below 7 
of other 10 countries. Another important factor that cannot be omitted is that only about 1/3 of 
the total shares in Chinese market can be traded (see Table 2.8), the remaining 2/3 shares are so-
called state-owned or legal-person-owned shares, which only can be transferred in negotiation 
outside of the secondary market. This phenomenon largely reduces the negotiability and the 
value of such shares. It is quite clear that the share prices will greatly depreciate if the authority 
allows all shares to be traded in the secondary market, just because of the surge in the supply of 
more tradable shares. So we can judge that the market capitalization in China has been over-
calculated.  
Table 2.8 Ownership Structure of Listed Companies in Chinese Stock Exchanges 
(1998-2002) 
 
    1998/12 1999/12 2000/12 2001/12 2002/12 
    Billion % Billion % Billion % Billion % Billion % 
Total Shares   252.68 100.00 308.90 100.00 379.17 100.00 521.80 100.00 587.55 100.00 
Total 166.48 65.89 200.93 65.05 243.74 64.28 340.49 65.25 383.87 65.33 
Sponsor Legal 
Person1 142.93 56.57 174.58 56.52 216.54 57.11 312.11 59.81 349.34 59.46 
Private 
Placement of 
Legal Person 15.23 6.03 18.95 6.14 21.42 5.65 24.53 4.70 29.97 5.10 






  Others 3.15 1.25 3.73 1.21 3.35 0.88 1.48 0.28 3.00 0.51 
Total 86.19 34.11 107.97 34.95 135.43 35.72 181.32 34.75 203.68 34.67 
A Shares 60.80 24.06 81.32 26.33 107.82 28.44 131.81 25.26 150.91 25.68 





  H Shares 12.00 4.75 12.45 4.03 12.45 3.28 33.19 6.36 36.01 6.13 
Data Source: www.csrc.gov.cn, China Securities Regulatory Commission (2003) 
Notes: Usually the sponsor legal persons in China are SOEs, so this part of shares can be treated as the 
state-owned shares. 
 
Another thing should be noticed in China’s stock market is that the major listed companies are 
the former state-owned companies. They usually are extremely huge and less profitable than 
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their privately-owned counterparts. This partly causes the very high price-earning ratio (P/E), 
which is commonly regarded as a criterion of market risk. Take a look at Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9 Performances of Selected Developing Stock Markets (1980-1999) 
 
Markets   1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 Avg.1 Adj. Avg.2 
China P/E3    16.7 47.8 32.6 32.6
 P/BV4 1.0 3.0 2.6 
 DY(%)5    3.2 0.8 1.4  
Argentina P/E   -3.16 15.0 39.4 -9.7 22.8
 P/BV 0.3 1.3 1.5 1.2 
 DY(%) 1.0 0.7 0.9 3.5 3.2 2.0  
Brazil P/E   4.7 36.3 23.5 10.8 13.5
 P/BV 0.3 0.5 1.6 0.8 
 DY(%) 12.8 2.3 9.4 3.4 3.2 4.7  
Chile P/E   7.9 17.1 35.0 13.9 13.9
 P/BV 1.0 2.1 1.7 1.5 
 DY(%) 3.3 7.5 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.9  
Mexico P/E   10.3 28.4 14.1 14.9 14.9
 P/BV 1.0 1.7 2.2 1.6 
 DY(%) 3.2 6.5 3.4 1.1 0.9 4.0  
Korea P/E   16.4 19.8 -33.5 15.2 24.5
 P/BV 1.3 1.3 2.0 1.6 
 DY(%) 8.6 4.1 0.5 1.4 0.6 2.8  
Malaysia P/E  19.4 23.6 25.1 -18.0 23.0 26.2
 P/BV 1.9 2.3 3.3 1.9 2.7 
 DY(%)  1.3 2.2 1.7 1.4 2.1  
Philippines P/E  3.0 11.3 19.0 22.2 15.1 16.7
 P/BV 0.5 2.6 3.2 1.4 2.5 
 DY(%) 8.9 2.3 0.6 0.9 1.7 
Thailand P/E   8.7 21.7 -12.2 9.2 16.1
 P/BV 2.1 3.3 2.1 2.8 
 DY(%) 8.8 9.6 4.2 2.2 0.3 5.4  
Data Source: Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, IFC, various years. 
Notes: 1. Averages of all years when data are available. For China, it covers year 
1993 to 1999; for Malaysia and Philippines, it is from 1984 to 1999; and all 
other countries are from 1980 to 1999. 
            2. Adjusted average of P/E ratio excludes those years with negative values. 
            3. P/E: Price-Earning Ratio. 
            4. P/BV: Price-Book Value Ratio. 
            5. DY: Dividend Yield. 
            6. Negative P/E ratio stands for the ratio of price to loss. 
 
Though it is believed that developing markets have relatively higher P/E ratio, due to the scarcity 
in the supply of securities, China’s figure is still abnormal. Using the adjusted average, China’s 
P/E is the highest among the 9 countries. The mean of the other 8 countries is 18.6, while China 
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is 32.6, 75% higher than the average level. Is this exceptional high ratio sustainable? On the 
fundamental side, only if the stocks can provide correspondingly high dividends, will the 
investors like to hold those stocks. Usually, developing markets have more neonatal companies, 
which grow much faster than other aged competitors. Thus good return in the form of bonus 
attracts people to buy those stocks. But paradoxically, China also has the lowest dividend yield 
(1.4% vs. the average level of 3.45% for other 8 markets). This means the investors in Chinese 
stocks market cannot get a reasonable return from dividends, so what they only can do is to get 
the price difference by buying and selling stocks at ‘right’ times. This is in line with the high 
turnover ratio in this market (see Table 2.10).  
Table 2.10 Turnover Ratio in Selected Developing Markets (1980-1999)1 
In Percentage 
 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 Avg.2 
China    115.9 134.2 187.1 
Argentina 27.0 41.3 33.6 12.3 12.0 32.5 
Brazil 48.3 49.3 23.6 47.9 53.0 58.3 
Chile 6.8 2.9 6.3 15.3 11.4 10.0 
Mexico 26.0 65.8 44.0 33.0 29.0 36.4 
Peru   5.7 39.4 18.6 30.7 
Korea 44.2 61.8 61.3 97.8 355.8 172.8 
Malaysia 25.6 13.4 24.6 35.9 39.8 53.3 
Philippines 20.9 14.1 13.6 26.2 46.5 36.0 
Thailand 24.1 32.1 92.6 41.4 90.6 73.1 
Data Source: Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, IFC, various years. 
Notes: 1. Turnover Ratio is calculated as total trading value divided by the 
average market capitalization in that year. 
            2. Average of all years when data are available. For China, it covers 
year 1992 to 1999; for Peru, it is from 1990 to 1999; and all other 
countries are from 1980 to 1999. 
 
China’s 187.1% turnover ratio is extremely high, only Korea has a comparable number of 
172.8%. This means the supply of stocks in these two actively traded markets is lower than the 
demand. It is no surprise to find that these two countries’ market capitalization to GDP ratios are 
also low (see Table 2.7). Providing more supply of publicly traded stocks can diversify the 
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investors’ risk; on the other side, those quick expanding companies can raise capital at equity 
markets with lower cost (compared with loans).  
 
One noticeable phenomenon in Chinese stock market is that though the high P/E ratio and 
turnover ratio imply the scarcity of stocks supply in domestic markets, many big Chinese 
companies choose to issue their shares in overseas markets, mainly in Hong Kong (H shares), 
New York (N shares) and Singapore (S shares) (see Table 2.11). Some famous IPOs include 
Huaneng Power International Inc, PetroChina Company Limited, China Mobile Limited and 
China Telecom Limited. By the end of 2002, there were a total of 75 Chinese companies listed 
overseas. 



























1991 5.00 5.00     5.00 5.00       
1992 20.75 10.00   10.75 94.09 50.00   44.09   
1993 95.79 42.59 40.41 12.79 375.47 194.83 60.93 38.13 81.58
1994 91.26 10.97 69.89 10.40 326.78 49.62 188.73 38.27 50.16
1995 31.60 5.32 15.38 10.90 150.32 22.68 31.46 33.35 62.83
1996 86.11 38.29 31.77 16.05 425.08 224.45 83.56 47.18 69.89
1997 267.63 105.65 136.88 25.10 1,293.82 655.06 360.00 80.76 198.00
1998 105.56 86.30 12.86 9.90 841.52 443.05 37.95 25.55 334.97
1999 122.93 98.11 23.05 1.77 944.56 572.63 47.17 3.79 320.97
2000 512.03 145.68 7.10 359.25 2,103.08 1,007.41 562.21 13.99 519.46
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
Notes: 1. A-Shares are renminbi denominated shares which only can be traded by Chinese 
residents and Chinese legal persons. With the new introduction of QFII provisions, 
foreign investor can also trade in A-Shares markets if they are authorized by PBC 
and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). B-Shares are foreign currency 
denominated shares, US dollar at SHSE and HK dollar at SZSE, which used to be 
only traded by foreign investors until February 19, 2001. H- and N- Shares are 
Chinese enterprises listed at Hong Kong Stock Exchange and New York Stock 
Exchange. 
 
- 31 - 
Uniquely, foreign investors pay much less than domestic investors for intrinsically identical 
shares. This even exists between A-Shares and B-Shares. Fernald and Rogers (1998) find that 
foreigners only pay about one-quarter the price paid by domestic residents, and there are about a 
difference of 4 percentage-points in expected returns between these two types of investors. They 
attributed the low Chinese expected returns to the limited alternative investments available in 
China. Then, here comes a paradox. Domestic stock market is still lack of supply, and companies 
can raise more funds in domestic market (due to the higher initial offering price), then why don’t 
the authorities encourage them to issue stocks domestically? One plausible explanation is that the 
authorities want to keep the stock prices going up continuously in a certain period of time. As the 
majority of domestic investors are individual investors, they are more sensitive to the sudden 
increase in the supply of stocks. But this guideline conflicts with the market law. Some 
companies failed in their first international IPOs, like China National Offshore Oil Corporation; 
while domestic residents cannot invest in those profitable and promising enterprises (those 
overseas listed companies are usually dominant powers in their industries, like oil and 
telecommunication industries). However, this trend has been revised in recent years, more and 
more overseas listed companies choose to list their stocks at domestic exchanges also. For 
instance, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation and China United Telecommunications 
Corporation issued their A-Shares in 2001 and 2002 respectively. By the end of 2002, of the 75 
overseas listed companies, 29 of them have listed both in domestic and overseas markets. 
 
Supply side is not the only problem of the Chinese stock market. The demand side, investors, 
should also be analyzed. One interesting thing in China is that though the number of investors is 
quite huge (about 68 million in two exchanges by the end of 2002), but 99% of them are 
- 32 - 
individual investors. Institutional investors, who control huge funds, are essential in stabilizing 
the market. Too many small participants in Chinese stock markets are wasting social resources, 
as they are usually impatient players with frequent transactions. This also can be an explanation 
of the high turnover ratio. Successful developed markets usually have many fund managers, who 
manage the investments for their clients. Individual investors don’t need to stare at the prices of 
their stocks. Larger investors’ average holding period is much longer than smaller investor. 
Fewer transactions can reduce the fluctuation of the market. In the US, pension funds, insurance 
funds and mutual funds are the major participants in the markets, with their professional 
knowledge, stocks trades are more rational and less frequent. On contrary, in China only 10% of 
insurance companies’ capital can be invested in the stock market. And the capital controlled by 
the securities investment funds is still a fraction in the market. Their total turnover in 2002 was 
166 billion yuan, about 6% of the whole market turnover value (CSRC, 2003).  Thus more funds 
should be encouraged to invest in domestic stock markets or the supervision authority in China 
should increase the minimum trading value of the stocks to reduce the too high turnover ratio. 
 
However, one recent reform in Chinese stock market was the introduction of Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII), which allowed qualified big foreign investor to invest in the 
domestic listed companies at SHSE and SZSE. On January 14, 2003, CSRC announced that 6 
Chinese banks and 3 foreign banks’ Shanghai branches are authorized to be the trustee banks for 
foreign investors. This could be looked as a transitional policy before fully opening of the 
domestic market to foreigners. This policy will not only bring more funds, but also can 
rationalize the participant structure in the markets. This gradual approach is harmonious with 
China’s consistency principle of liberalization. 
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Discussions on the various aspects of the stock market regulations are also needed. The Chinese 
stock markets have always been evaluated as poorly regulated. All companies are required to 
promulgate their semi-annual and annual financial statements before certain dates announced by 
CSRC, and financial companies and special treated companies (which have deficits in the latest 
two fiscal years), are even required to publicize their quarterly financial reports. But in reality, 
firms always can find reasons to delay the disclosure of their reports. Insider trading is also a 
very severe problem in China. Events analysis has shown that the trading volume and stock 
prices fluctuate more markedly just before disclosure dates of some regulation policies and 
financial statements.  
 
Some conclusions and policy suggestions from the view of money market and capital market are 
presented below.  
 
1. Money market has been established in China and shows its effectiveness in allocating 
funds, but due to the lack of interest rate determination mechanism, the efficiency of 
monetary policy has been largely reduced. Thus we suggest freeing the determination of 
interest rate first is critical to the liberalization of capital account. 
 
2. The relative sizes of Chinese stock markets are still quite small, and it shows severer 
speculation and weak regulation in the market. The stock markets still need to be 
expanded in the scope of listed shares and institutional investors. More rigorous 
supervision should be imposed before further opening.  
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2.5. Foreign Related Economy 
 
Another aspect which is worth noticing before opening the capital account and full liberalization 
of the economy is the foreign related economic sector. China liberalized its foreign trade at an 
earlier stage and at a much higher speed than its financial sectors, which is very similar to its 
neighboring countries. From the beginning of the economic reform, foreign trade has been 
looked upon as a major part of the whole reform process. Both central government and local 
governments have taken the figure of foreign trade as one of the most important achievements 
during their administration period.  
 
From Table 2.12, we find foreign trade has been an essential part of the Chinese economy; it 
brings China tens of billions of trade surplus every year. China’s opening of current account at 
the end of year 1996 made foreign trade companies more convenient in business, and its sudden 
devaluation of renminbi in 1994 (from 5.8 yuan per USD to about 8.5 yuan per USD) greatly 
enhanced the competitiveness of Chinese goods in the world market. Though the authority has 
never announced to fix the domestic currency to any foreign currency, the fact is that renminbi is 
almost pegged to US dollar (only 1% fluctuation allowed). This policy is beneficial to China, as 
US is the largest export destination for China; and most of its competitors, namely ASEAN and 
some Latin American countries, also are more or less taking US dollar as the major benchmark 
of their currencies. A fixed exchange rate lowers the cost of foreign trade, as it eliminates the 
fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
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Table 2.12 Foreign Trades of Selected Developing Countries (1975-2000) 
 
COUNTRY   1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
China Export  7,689.0 18,099.3 27,350.0 62,091.0 148,797.0 249,297.0 
 Import 7,925.6 19,941.3 42,252.0 53,345.0 129,113.0 206,132.0 
 Export/GDP   10.0 17.7 21.1 23.1 
  Trade Balance/GDP     -5.4 2.5 2.8 4.0 
Argentina Export 2,961.3 8,021.4 8,396.1 12,352.5 20,967.4 26,409.0 
 Import 3,946.5 10,540.6 3,814.2 4,076.0 20,121.7 25,243.0 
 Export/GDP    10.0 8.1 9.3 
  Trade Balance/GDP       6.7 0.3 0.4 
Chile Export  1,552.1 4,705.3 3,804.1 8,372.7 16,024.2 19,245.7 
 Import 1,525.0 5,796.9 3,071.6 7,742.4 15,900.4 18,507.2 
 Export/GDP 37.2 17.0 26.3 30.6 25.2 27.3 
  Trade Balance/GDP 0.7 -3.9 5.1 2.3 0.2 1.0 
Mexico Export  2,903.8 18,031.0 26,757.3 40,710.8 79,541.6 166,367.0 
 Import 6,580.2 22,143.8 19,116.0 43,548.4 75,858.3 182,702.0 
 Export/GDP  9.5 21.1 17.3 33.0 29.1 
  Trade Balance/GDP   -2.2 6.0 -1.2 1.5 -2.9 
Peru Export 1,290.9 3,898.3 2,978.5 3,230.9 5,575.1 7,027.7 
 Import 2,550.0 2,499.5 1,835.0 3,469.9 9,224.0 8,796.8 
 Export/GDP    30.9 10.6 13.3 
  Trade Balance/GDP       -2.3 -7.0 -3.4 
Korea Export  4,945.0 17,512.0 30,282.0 65,016.0 125,058.0 172,268.0 
 Import 7,274.0 22,292.0 31,136.0 69,844.0 135,119.0 160,481.0 
 Export/GDP  30.5 33.1 26.1 25.6 41.8 
  Trade Balance/GDP   -8.3 -0.9 -1.9 -2.1 2.9 
Malaysia Export 3,843.0 12,944.7 15,316.1 29,451.5 73,913.5 98,135.0 
 Import 3,565.8 10,779.3 12,253.2 29,257.6 77,690.8 82,198.7 
 Export/GDP 44.6 53.7 47.9 66.9 84.3 109.2 
  Trade Balance/GDP 3.2 9.0 9.6 0.4 -4.3 17.7 
Philippines Export  2,294.5 5,741.2 4,611.4 8,116.8 17,501.8 39,783.0 
 Import 3,755.7 8,291.4 5,454.7 13,003.7 28,340.5 33,808.0 
 Export/GDP  17.8 15.3 21.1 24.0 60.4 
  Trade Balance/GDP   -7.9 -2.8 -12.7 -14.9 9.1 
Singapore Export  5,376.2 19,375.3 22,812.3 52,729.7 118,268.0 137,804.0 
 Import 8,133.1 24,007.3 26,285.2 60,773.5 124,507.0 134,545.0 
 Export/GDP 100.0 161.1 123.1 138.6 141.5 149.8 
  Trade Balance/GDP -51.3 -38.5 -18.7 -21.1 -7.5 3.5 
Thailand Export  2,208.5 6,505.4 7,120.6 23,068.3 56,439.4 69,056.8 
 Import 3,279.6 9,213.6 9,242.0 33,045.2 70,786.1 61,923.9 
 Export/GDP 14.9 20.2 17.9 26.8 33.9 61.1 
  Trade Balance/GDP -7.2 -8.4 -5.3 -11.6 -8.6 6.3 
Data source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (2001)  
Notes: Export, import and trade balance are in million US$, and all ratios are in 
percentage. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are treated as foreign economies. 
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With its entry to WTO in 2001, China will probably have a larger share in the world trade market. 
In the past 20 years, China’s annual growth rate of export was 4.4% higher than the 
corresponding growth rate of GDP. So it is not exaggerated to say foreign trade has been one 
important engine of the economic development. 
 
In those sample countries, many of them are entitled as foreign trade oriented economies, 
especially those Asian countries, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand all 
have very high export-to-output ratios. But for China, the problem is that its absolute export 
value has already exceeded its neighbors, and foreign trade continues to play an essential role in 
the country’s development. Furthermore, the relatively developed regions in China, eastern 
provinces, are even relying more on foreign trade. Thus the level or stability of renminbi has 
essential influence on the Chinese economy. Then opening the capital account will not only 
affect the capital inflows, but also will affect the foreign trade through the fluctuations of 
exchange rate. To China, the issue of the capital account liberalization even has a greater impact 
than other less trade-relied countries.  
 
How to measure the openness of an economy? If we use the export to output ratio, we find that 
China’s ratio is quite low, 0.231 versus 0.567 (average of the other 9 countries) in year 2000. But 
if we look at the effective average tariff level, findings are different. 
 
As subsidies are still a very common issue, in particular in agriculture (WTO Annual Report, 
2001), our analysis will only focus on the industrial average tariff rates. As a result of Uruguay 
Round-related tariff reductions, on top of seven rounds of tariff negotiations held under GATT 
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1947, developed countries’ average bound and applied tariff rates on industrial products have 
fallen to low levels (7% and 5%, respectively), on a most-favored-nation basis. Figure 2.7 gives 
out the sketch of average bound tariff on industrial products for some selected economies.  






























































Data Source: WTO Annual Report 2001, WTO, 2001 
Note: The figure of China is from www.customs.gov.cn, Customs General Administration 
People’s Republic of China. 
 
It is interesting to find that China’s average tariff on industrial products is quite low, only higher 
than some developed countries. If we take average bound tariff as a proxy for openness of 
domestic market, China’s trade barriers are relatively fewer than its counterparts at similar 
income level. Though the negative correlation between average tariff level and income is 
ambiguous (see Figure 2.8), we still can find that on average high income countries have lower 
tariff rates than low income countries. China’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2000 
was 840 US dollars, but its average tariff on industrial products was only 15%. This low figure 
can be explained by the following reasons. As China is not the initiatory member of World Trade 
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Organization (WTO), it sacrifices a lot in the protection of domestic industries in the negotiation 
with other initiatory members on the road to entering WTO. Thus many Chinese scholars think 
the process of market liberalization is too quick. However, the concessions are given mostly in 
agriculture and service sectors, not industry products, which we are focusing on. In the industrial 
sector, as China has already attracted tens of billions foreign direct investments, in addition with 
its low labor input, Chinese products are already competitive in the world market. So from this 
angle, China doesn’t need a high tariff rate on industrial products, as it is becoming the largest 
manufacturer in the world.  
 
Data Source: Average bound tariffs on industrial products are from WTO Annual Report, 2001. 
                      Gross National Income Per Capita is from World Development Indicators, World 
Bank, 2001. 
Notes: Tariff rates are in percentage, and GNI is in US dollars. 
 
How to correctly measure the openness of an economy largely depends on the choice of criteria. 
By using the above two different methods (export to GDP ratio and average tariff rate), we get 
two contrary conclusions. Our judgment on China’s openness is mixed. China is on the way to an 
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open economy; but as its domestic market is too large compared with most other countries, the 
country’s relative openness is still limited. 
 
Here we introduce a new ratio to measure the maturity of an economy’s foreign trade. Figure 2.9 
and Figure 2.10 depict the ratio of service export to merchandise export and its relation to 
income for selected countries. We can intuitively find that, in general, the higher the income the 
higher the service to merchandise ratio. China’s service export ratio is 0.51, lower than all other 
countries, except Mexico. This reminds us that China is still immature in the pattern of foreign 
trade, and its export of high value-added commercial service is still less developed than its 
industrial products export.  



















































Data Source: WTO Annual Report, WTO, 2001 
Note: The shares of each country’s service export and merchandise export in the world market 
are used. 
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Data Source: WTO Annual Report, WTO, 2001 
                       World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2001. 
Note: The shares of each country’s service export and merchandise export in the world market 
are used. GNI per capita is measured in US dollar. 
 
Table 2.13 Foreign Reserves for Selected Developing Countries (1980-2000) 
 











China 2444.00 0.16 12032.00 0.31 21240.90 0.57 51152.30 0.59 129600.00 0.82 
Argentina 5421.50 0.66 3132.80 0.90 3376.20 1.18 9764.90 0.72 19301.20 0.99 
Chile 2508.40 0.55 2283.90 0.82 4330.60 0.79 9577.40 0.90 11542.10 0.81 
Mexico 2392.90 0.14 4549.50 0.26 6964.90 0.23 11351.30 0.22 27262.20 0.19 
Peru 1601.30 0.82 1745.30 1.05 808.20 0.33 5570.00 0.90 6465.70 0.96 
Korea 2303.70 0.13 2623.20 0.09 10409.30 0.21 21994.60 0.24 73796.70 0.60 
Malaysia 3521.20 0.42 4553.60 0.41 6938.50 0.34 16077.30 0.31 22700.00 0.36 
Philippines 2298.80 0.35 611.50 0.12 750.80 0.08 4412.20 0.23 10270.20 0.39 
Singapore 5148.80 0.27 11695.50 0.49 19504.60 0.46 46213.10 0.55 61502.40 0.59 
Thailand 1310.30 0.18 2080.90 0.25 9438.90 0.41 24292.60 0.51 24655.40 0.52 
Average2   0.39   0.49   0.45   0.51   0.60 
Data Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (2001) 
Notes: 1. This is the ratio of international reserve to annual import. 
           2.  Average ratio of those countries except China. 
 
However, more than ten years of consecutive trade surplus and tens of billions of direct foreign 
investment (DFI) received every year already provided China with a sound base of foreign 
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reserves, which will be extremely critical when an economy faces great surge in capital flows 
after capital account liberalization (see Table 2.13).  
 
China’s foreign reserve has been the largest among developing economies, and the second 
largest in the world in 2002, after Japan. And this quick trend of increase is still on-going. 
Measured by the ratio of foreign reserve to import, China also has been above the average of the 
9 included comparable countries since 1990. China was probably the largest DFI receiver in 
2002, exceeding the US for the first time. This solid background could be the source of foreign 
investors’ confidence, and also an effective weapon when the authority needs to defend its 
currency against speculation attacks, just like the Asian financial crises.  
 
Looking from the foreign trade angle, we find China’s foreign trade to be much more open, 
compared with financial sector. It does have a liberalized foreign trade system with high foreign 
trade value and low tariff rates, and sufficient foreign reserves. In an open economy, external 
shocks will affect the domestic market through the foreign related sectors. The more the country 
depends on foreign trade, the more likely it will be affected by these shocks, especially with an 
open capital account. 
 
The conclusion and policy suggestions from the foreign economy point of view are as follow: 
1. The openness of Chinese economy is mixed (depends on different measurements). 
However, the pattern of foreign trade is still immature. High value added service exports 
are still not well developed. 
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2. China relies heavily on international trade. A stable and predictable exchange rate is thus 
critical to China. Under current situation, fixing the renminbi to USD is a wise decision. 
But further full convertibility of renminbi should proceed with sufficient caution. 
 
3. China has a sound base of foreign reserve, this backup will be extremely important when 
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2.6. Conclusion 
 
From three different aspects, namely fiscal soundness, domestic money and capital market and 
foreign related economy, we conclude that China is still not ready to open its capital account at 
present. The Chinese government still needs to strengthen its fiscal control and maintain a 
balanced budget. A market-oriented money market and a well-operated stock market haven’t 
been established yet. A liberalized capital account may have greater influence on China, as it has 
a relatively big foreign related economy. More reform in those sectors should be taken, and 
precautions should be paid before going to the last step of economic liberalization—opening the 
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Chapter Three: 




What exchange rate regime a country should adopt has been an aged question discussed among 
economists for decades. But the debates never give out clear guidelines for developing countries, 
which face the choice of foreign exchanges. Furthermore, this old question became even more 
urgent after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and its later offshoots in Eastern Europe (e.g. 
Russia) and Latin American (e.g. Argentina). Although the pivotal cause of the crisis was not the 
exchange rate, an inappropriate foreign exchange arrangement made this crisis even severer. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that many of those suffered countries changed their exchange rate 
regimes in or after the crisis.  
 
Exchange rate arrangements can be roughly divided into two major groups, fixed and flexible. 
The traditional analysis of the choice between these two options focuses on the general 
evaluation of their benefits and costs. Frankel (1999) states:  
 
The two big advantages of a fixed exchange rate…are: (1) that it reduces transactions costs and 
exchange rate risk which can discourage trade and investment, and (2) that it provides a credible 
nominal anchor for monetary policy. The big advantage of a floating exchange rate is that it enables 
a country to pursue an independent policy. 
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However, just as Frankel (1999) points out, no single currency regime is right for all countries or 
at all times. Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, we have many 
more intermediate solutions between peg and independent floating, e.g. crawling peg, crawling 
band, group floating, managed floating. The general trend in the last three decades is towards a 
floating regime. Table 3.1 reports the evolution of such trend.  
Table 3.1 Exchange Arrangements Evolution (1975-2000) 
             
  1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000* 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Pegged 112 88.2 107 75.9 95 63.8 87 56.1 68 37.8 101 54.3 
    to US Dollar 52  41  32  27  23    
    to Pound Sterling 8  1  1  0  0    
    to French Franc 13  14  14  14  14    
    to Others 39  51  48  46  31    
Flexible 15 11.8 34 24.1 54 36.2 68 43.9 112 62.2 85 45.7 
    Limited Flexibility     12  13  13  38  
    More Flexibility     42  55  99  47  
Total Countries 127 100.0 141 100.0 149 100.0 155 100.0 180 100.0 186 100.0 
Data Source: Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, IMF, various years. 
Note: All exchange arrangements are as of December 31 for all years. 
         The classification for year 2000 is based on the country’s de facto exchange 
arrangement, which is different from other years. 
 
In 1975, only 15 countries chose a flexible exchange arrangement, including both developed 
countries (e.g. United States, Japan and Italy) and developing countries (e.g. Afghanistan, 
Turkey and Yugoslavia). The majority still preferred to peg to one hard currency or a composite 
of currencies, and US dollar and French franc were among the most popular. However, more and 
more countries found they could not maintain a hard peg system as the world economy was more 
integrated—pegging to one currency means floating to others. The number of countries with 
flexible exchange arrangement reached its peak of 112 in 1995, that is to say, more than half of 
all countries chose to be floater. As the classification for year 2000 is based on the de facto 
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arrangement7, which is different from previous years, we cannot compare this year’s number 
with others’ imprudently. 
 
We find that the trend of the exchange rate regime evolution is toward a more flexible 
arrangement. One natural question is that why more countries choose a more flexible regime? Or 
what factors stimulate those countries to change their exchange rate regimes? 
 
How to judge whether a country makes a correct choice on the exchange arrangement? Scholars 
and policy makers usually talk about the benefits and pitfalls of each choice. However, the 
advantages and disadvantages of a certain regime are not applicable to all countries with 
different economic characteristics. Apart from knowing the so-called theoretical appraisals of 
those regimes, we should focus more on some economic factors or selection criteria that may 
influence a country’s decision on the choice of a right regime. This chapter attempts to present 
some empirical findings on how to choose a correct exchange rate regime for an individual 








                                                
7 In 2000, the classification system is based on the member countries’ actual, de facto, regimes that may differ from 
their officially announced arrangements. IMF., “Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions,” 2001. 
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3.2. Literature Review 
 
The correct choice on exchange rate regime is always a hot topic in economics, thus a 
considerable amount of literature has been published over the past few decades. One well-known 
proposition in macroeconomic theory is that a country cannot simultaneously achieve the 
‘impossible trinity’ of full capital mobility, exchange rate stability and independence of 
monetary policy. It is possible, at most, to achieve any two of these objectives, making it 
necessary to sacrifice the third. For instance, Ahluwalia (2000) states that since most developing 
countries are engaged in progressively liberalizing capital movements, it follows that they must 
plan for greater exchange rate flexibility. The presence of capital control reduces the degree of 
exchange vulnerability, but it does not eliminate it entirely. However, such generalized 
suggestions do not consider each country’s characteristics and the correct timing to opt for or 
change to a preferable exchange arrangement. Unexpectedly, little work has been done to 
empirically test the choice of exchange rate regimes on the basis of countries’ economic 
characteristics.  
 
In the seminal paper, “Determinants of Exchange Rate Practices”, Heller (1978) collects cross-
sectional data of 86 countries based on the exchange arrangements as of July 1976. Five 
characteristics of a country—size of the economy, openness, inflation differential, financial 
integration and geographical trade concentration—are used to examine their partial and 
combined influence on the choice of exchange rate regimes. Among these explanatory variables, 
three of them, namely economic size, openness and geographical trade concentration, are found 
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to be the most important. However, his study doesn’t point out the significance of those 
parameters.  
 
As for Holden et al (1979), besides IMF’s classification of exchange rate arrangements, a more 
accurate index of exchange rate flexibility is constructed, and cross-sectional data for 75 
countries in 1975 are estimated in the linear form by ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The 
variables he used are openness (OI), capital mobility (CM), product diversification of exports 
(PC), geographical trade concentration (GC), degree of economic development (PCGDP) and 
divergence between inflation rates (ID). The signs of variables OI, GC and ID are in line with 
those found by Heller, but the variable CM is statistically insignificant. The inflation differential 
(ID) is found to be most important, followed by PC and OI. In contrast to Heller’s result, GC is 
found to be less important.  
 
Edwards (1999) uses a cross-country, unbalanced panel data set for 49 developing and middle-
income countries during 1980-92 to analyze why some countries have adopted pegged exchange 
rate regimes while others have opted for more flexible systems. 12 political and economic 
variables are used to estimate in a Probit model, including political instability, governing 
coalition, economic growth rate, per capita income, etc. He suggests that a fixed exchange rate 
regime is more credible than a flexible regime. However, if the pegged regime is abandoned—
that is, if the authorities decide (or are forced) to devalue—the authorities suffer a significant 
political cost. His empirical results indicate that for a sample of developing and middle-income 
countries, countries with more unstable political regimes will tend to select more flexible 
exchange rate regimes. He emphasizes more on the political aspect, rather than from the 
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economic view. One problem in his analysis is how to quantify some quality measure, especially 
those political variables. The robustness of political influence on the decision of exchange 
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3.3. Economic Consideration on Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Following Heller, Holden and Edwards, several economic characteristics, which are critical 
when a country faces the options of those exchange rate regimes, will be included in our study. 
The following discussion will outline the reasons why these characteristics should theoretically 
be included. 
 
a) Inflation Level 
 
It is believed that countries with inflation rates similar to those of their major trade partners will 
find a fixed exchange rate more applicable than if the inflation differential is large. Though 
whether the purchasing power parity holds or not is still debatable (Cuddington and Liang, 2000; 
Lothian and Taylor, 2000; and Engel, 2000), it is clear that the domestic price level and nominal 
exchange rate are negatively related, as higher domestic price will cause the domestic currency 
to depreciate in the long run. 
 
Inflation rate is usually a key target of monetary policy in many countries. Given the theorem of 
the ‘impossible trinity’, if a country has hyperinflation, it is impossible to keep a fixed exchange 
rate. Countries whose inflation rates differ from world average largely will find it impossible to 
maintain their exchange rate for a long period of time. This means the higher the inflation, the 
more likely the country will floats its currency.  
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In order to minimize the fluctuation of price level, a four-year average of the percentage change 
of consumer price index (CPI) is adopted in our model. For instance, when we estimate the 
model of year 1990, the average CPI of 1987-1990 is used.  
 
b) Size of the Economy 
 
Economic size of a country is also included in this study. A small country is a price taker in the 
world market, a stable exchange rate is more critical to it, as it cannot influence the world prices 
to adjust its foreign trade. It also has less ability to intervene in the foreign exchange market if it 
chooses a flexible exchange rate regime and want to smooth the fluctuations. A larger country 
has more diversified goods markets; disturbances of prices in different markets may offset each 
other, thereby making a floating exchange rate smooth. Therefore, we suggest a large country 
favors a flexible exchange rate, while a smaller country should prefer a fixed resolution.  
 
Traditionally, we measure the size of an economy either by its gross domestic products (GDP) or 
its gross national products (GNP). GNP includes some outputs produced by national companies 
in other countries, which will not influence home country’s export.  Here we consider the effect 
through the foreign trade sector, no matter the good or service is produced by domestic 
companies or foreign investors thus GDP is preferred. Logarithm of GDP is utilized in modeling 
to cut down the great discrepancy between different countries. 
 
c) Degree of Economic Openness 
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In our study, the openness of an economy is measured by the trade to output ratio. This index is a 
good description of a country’s integration to the world goods and services markets. The 
traditional thought of degree of openness is that it has a direct impact on the adjustment costs to 
external shocks. Under fixed exchange rates and with constant prices, it is much more expensive 
for a relatively closed economy to adjust the entire domestic economy in order to eliminate trade 
deficit of a certain size than it would be for a relatively open economy (Heller, 1978). Thus, 
relatively closed economies will find flexible exchange rates more attractive than open 
economies. But the assumption behind this logic is that—the external shock is a temporary 
change, the prices will move back to its origin. Then one may ask what will be the consequence 
if this shock is a permanent change? If this is the case, we have to admit that an instantaneous, or 
quicker, adjustment of domestic price structure could minimize the cost of such shocks in the 
long run. Thus the relation between this determinant and the flexibility of exchange rate seems 
undecided. We expect to see a mixed effect of openness on the exchange rate determination. 
 
d) Capital Mobility 
 
In a world of absolutely free capital mobility, capital movement may substitute the exchange rate 
flexibility. That is to say, with fixed arrangements, international capital flows (either inflow or 
outflow) may frustrate the aims of domestic monetary policy. On the opposite, a flexible 
exchange rate will mitigate the pressure of such capital flows8.  Thus we expect a country with 
higher capital mobility to be more likely to choose a flexible regime. The measure of the 
mobility or the international financial integration is a challenge. Following Heller (1978), we’ll 
                                                
8 Under the classical Mundell-Fleming Model, monetary policy is ineffective with perfect capital mobility and fixed 
exchange rate 
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use the ratio of foreign assets to money supply as a proxy. Among different measurements of 
money supply, M1 is chosen in our estimation. More developed countries tend to have both 
higher foreign assets and greater quasi-money ratio. Thus compared with M1, with the same 
amount of foreign assets, the use of M2 as the measurement of money supply will give 
developed countries lower ratios, disguising the true degree of international financial integration. 
So it will be more accurate to choose M1 as the money supply in our modeling. 
 
e) Trade Diversity 
 
Trade diversity (DIV) should also be noticed in the determination of an appropriate exchange 
arrangement. Countries with diversified trade partners will be less affected by external 
disturbance than those with high trade concentration to one or a few major trade partners. In an 
extreme case, if a country only has one trade partner, then pegging its currency to that trade 
partner to eliminate the uncertainty of foreign exchange will be a natural choice. The typical 
examples are those CFA9 zone countries, which were the French colonies before World War II. 
On the other hand, if a country of diversified trade patterns pegs to a certain currency, then any 
appreciation of that currency may weaken that country’s competitiveness in other markets. Thus 
they will tend to choose a floating exchange arrangement. 
 
To measure a country’s trade diversity, we first collect the data of its total annual trade volume, 
and the trade volume with its largest trade partner and tenth trade partner. And the diversity ratio 
is defined as below: 
                                                
9 Franc de la Communauté Française d'Afrique (Franc of the French Community of Africa). CFA franc zone 
includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep. of, Côte d'Ivoire, Eq. 
Guinea Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. They all fixed their currency to French franc. 
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TPTPDIV 101 −≡  
 
where DIVi is the trade diversity index for country i; 
           TPi1 is the trade volume of country i with its largest trade partner;    
          TPi10 is the trade volume of country i with its tenth trade partner;   
          TTi is the total trade volume of country i.         
 
Thus a higher DIV value means less trade diversity. And the range of possible DIV is between 0 
and 1. 
 
f) Level of International Reserve 
 
The quantity of a country’s international reserve also could affect its exchange rate regime 
choice. Ceteris paribus, the higher international reserve, the greater the ability of the country to 
finance balance of payments deficits; and thus it is less likely to adjust the nominal exchange rate. 
Furthermore, the higher international reserve, the greater the ability of the country to intervene in 
the forex market to maintain the currency par. These two reasons suggest that compared with 
countries with abundant international reserve, those have less reserve are less likely to choose a 
fixed regime. But one possible paradox is that those countries with flexible regimes are less 
necessary to maintain a high level of reserve to protect their currencies. From this point of view, 
the causality is ambiguous—the lower level of reserve is the result of a more flexible regime 
rather than a determinant in favor of such regime. However, the negative relationship between 
these two variables holds.  
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It is not proper to use the data of international reserve at its level, as a bigger country tends to 
have a larger foreign exchange market, which requires more foreign currency to intervene in the 
market when there is a need. Thus the ratio of the reserve to import volume is applied. 
 
g) Domestic Money Market Development 
 
The development of a country’s money market measures the ability of the country to fulfill its 
economic target through monetary policy; in other words, a country may rely more on the 
monetary policy if the money market is more developed. As the Mundell-Fleming model points 
out, monetary policy will be effective only if the country adopts the floating arrangement. So for 
a country with well developed money market, the cost to choosing a fixed regime and giving up 
the monetary instruments will be very high. Here we use the ratio of M3 to M1 to measure the 
depth of the money market. A low ratio of this variable means even if the country chooses a 
flexible regime, the efficiency of its monetary policy is limited. Thus, we expect to see countries 
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3.4. Methodology 
 
The Logit and other discrete models were originally developed by psychologists and later 
adapted and extended by economists for describing consumer choices and policy decisions. As 
our study focuses on the choice between different exchange rate regimes, which cannot be 
precisely quantified, we’ll introduce a Logit model here. 
 
In a binary response model, interest lies in the response probability.  
 
(3.1)               )()()1( 110 ββββ xFxxFxyP kk =+++== K                        
 
where xi denotes the explanatory variables ( βx =β0+ kk xx ββ ++K11 ), and F is a distribution 
function taking on values strictly between zero and one: 0<F(z)<1, for all real numbers z. In the 
Logit model, we assume  
 
(3.2)              ))exp(1/()exp()( zzzF +=  
 
The F function is a strict increasing function in its definition range and it increases most quickly 
at z=0. F(z) →0 as z→-∞ and F(z) →1 as z→∞.  
 
Because of the nonlinear relationship between the response probability and the explanatory 
variables, ordinary least squares and weighted least squares are not applicable to estimate a Logit 
model, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method is used to estimate the parameters. If 
we suppose,  
 
(3.3)             yy xFxFxyG −−= 1))(1()();( βββ ,  y=0,1.  
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We can see that when y=0, we get )(1 βxF− ; when y=1, we get )( βxF . The log-likelihood 
function for observation i is a function of the parameters, βi, and the data (xi,yi). It is obtained by 
taking the log of (3.3): 
 
(3.4)             ))(1log()1())(log()( βββ xFyxFyl iii −−+=  
 
As the values of F function are strictly between zero and one, )(βil  is well-defined for all values 
of β. The log-likelihood for a sample size of k is obtained by summing (3.4) across all 
observations: )()(
1
ββ ∑= k ilL . The MLE of β, denoted by βˆ , maximizes the log-likelihood.  
 
The likelihood ratio (LR) test is employed in testing multiple hypotheses. The likelihood ratio 
statistic is twice the difference in the log-likelihoods: 
 
(3.5)            )(2 rur LLLR −=  
 
where urL  is the log-likelihood value for the unrestricted model, and rL  is the log-likelihood 
value for the restricted model. Because rur LL ≥ , LR is nonnegative and usually strictly positive. 
The multiplication by two in (3.5) is needed so that LR has an approximate chi-square 
distribution under H0.  
 
After getting the estimators of all explanatory variables, the evaluation of goodness-of-fit is the 
next step. The usual statistic is the percentage of correct prediction. For each i, we compute the 
estimated probability that yi takes on the value one. The cut-off point is usually 0.5. (If 
)ˆ( βxF >0.5, the prediction is unity; if )ˆ( βxF ≤0.5, the prediction is zero.) The percentage of 
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those correct predictions will be reported. But the individual correct percentage for each of the 
two outcomes is equally important. A model that only can predict one (or zero) is not convincing. 
 
There are many pseudo R-squared measures for binary response. McFadden (1974) suggests the 
measure 0/1 LLur− , where urL  is the log-likelihood function for the estimated  model, and 0L  is 
the log-likelihood function in the model with only an intercept. 
 
The partial effect of those explanatory variables on the response probability is one of the most 
important aspects we are interested in. If xi is a continuous variable, its partial effect on 
)1( xyP =  is obtained from the partial derivative: 
 




xyP ββ )()1( =∂
=∂
,          where 
dz
zdFzf )()( ≡  
 
In the Logit model, F is a strictly increasing function, so f(z)>0 holds for all z. Therefore, the 
partial effect of xi on the probability of binary response depends on the product of its pseudo 
coefficient βi and )( βxf , which means the partial effect always has the same sign as βi. However, 
(3.6) shows that the relative effects of any two explanatory variables do not depend on x: the 
ratio of the partial effects for xj and xh is βj/βh. Thus the comparison of explanatory variables can 
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3.5. Empirical Results 
 
The model that we estimate is in the following form: 
 
ER = F (CPI, GDP, OPEN, FA, DIV, IR, MM) 
 
Where ER is the choice of exchange rate regimes between floating and fixed, 1 and 0 are used to 
represent floating and fixed respectively;                   
           CPI is the four-year average of the percentage change of consumer price index; 
           GDP is the log form of gross domestic product of all countries; 
           OPEN is the ratio of total trade to gross domestic product; 
           FA is the ratio of foreign assets to M1; 
           DIV measures the trade diversity, it is calculated as follow: 
           DIV = (trade with the 1st partner-trade with the 10th partner)/total trade; 
           IR is the ratio of total international reserve to import; 
     MM is the ratio of M3 to M1. 
 
 
In this chapter, a Logit model will be applied to estimate the determination mechanism of the 
choice on exchange arrangement. The actual choice of countries will be taken as the binary 
response, which only has two possible outcomes. Seven economic characteristics are treated as 
independent explanatory variables. The significance of the coefficients, partial effects of 
different variables, overall prediction efficiency and other econometric traits will be analyzed.  
 
In order to use the Logit Model in our analysis, we divide the exchange rate regimes into two 
groups, fixed and floating. Though the real choices of those countries vary between these two 
extremes, the estimated exchange rate choice is still suggestive. The higher the ER value, the 
more likely the economy should choose a relatively flexible regime. And the classification of the 
exchange rate regimes follows IMF’s annual report on exchange rate arrangements. 
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To facilitate the comparison of evolution of exchange regime choices, we fix the sample to 87 
countries10, and run the regression in three different years: 1990, 1995 and 200011. The results 
are summarized as follow: 
Table 3.2 Empirical Results for the Logit Model 
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Observations with ER=0 48 37 49 
Observations with ER=1 39 50 38 
McFadden R-Square 0.283 0.228 0.229 
LR Statistic 33.875 27.079 27.249 
Probability (LR stat) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 
% of Correct Prediction 72.41% 77.01% 63.87% 
% of Correct Prediction when ER=0 81.63% 70.27% 71.43% 
% of Correct Prediction when ER=1 60.53% 82.00% 55.26% 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors, and *, ** and *** indicates 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
The LR statistic suggests that the probability of multiple null hypotheses (all coefficients equal 
zero) is very tiny, lower than 1%. Acceptable R-Square value and good prediction ability suggest 
those variables are highly related to the dependent variable. The signs of those explanatory 
variables attract the attention. Table 3.3 summarizes the expected signs and the estimated results 
from our sample countries. 
                                                
10 See Appendix C for the countries included in estimation. 
11 We choose different years to see the evolution and the consistency of the empirical model. 
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Table 3.3 Signs of Explanatory Variables 
     
Estimated Coefficient Signs 
Variable Expected Signs 1990 1995 2000 
CPI + + + + 
GDP + + + + 
OPEN +/- - - + 
FA + + + + 
DIV - - - - 
IR - - - + 
MM + + - + 
 
 
Most signs of the explanatory variables accord with our theoretical analysis, though they are not 
consistent in all three models. The only exceptions are the coefficient of international reserve in 
2000 and the coefficient of money market development in 1995. However, both of them are 
statistically insignificant. Although not all the coefficients in the three equations are statistically 
significant, most signs of the explanatory variables are correct and the overall performance of the 
Logit Model is quite good. This can be shown by the McFadden R-Square statistic and the 
prediction evaluation test. The percentages of correct prediction for three equations are 72.41%, 
77.01% and 63.87% respectively. This certifies that those economic characteristics are decisive 
when a country plans to make a choice between different exchange rate regimes; and our 
previous theoretical analysis is in line with the results we get from the model. 
 
Though the signs of those explanatory variables are in line with our theoretical prediction, their 
significance remains questionable. Many of them seem insignificant. Naturally, the next step is 
to exclude those insignificant variables from the regression, and focus on those variables which 
have statistical meaning. Regressions of the reduced equations for the same 87 countries at those 
three years are performed. The table below presents the empirical results. 
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Table 3.4 Empirical Results for the Reduced Logit Model 
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Observations with ER=0 48 37 49 
Observations with ER=1 39 50 38 
McFadden R-Square 0.252 0.210 0.217 
LR Statistic 30.023 24.945 25.826 
Probability (LR stat) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
% of Correct Prediction 74.71% 75.86% 66.67% 
% of Correct Prediction when ER=0 83.67% 70.27% 71.43% 
% of Correct Prediction when ER=1 63.16% 80.00% 60.53% 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors, and *, ** and *** indicates significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.4 shows us more concise and instructive results. As in unrestricted modeling, the Logit 
model fits the year of 1990 best, with four significant variables, excluding constant. GDP, FA, 
DIV and MM are supposed to be the most critical characteristics which should be noticed when a 
country makes a choice on the exchange rate regimes. If we compare the relative importance of 
these four variables, we’ll see that the development of domestic money market has the largest 
partial effect on the choice of a country’s exchange rate regimes—four times larger than the 
effect of GDP. The prediction of fixed choice seems more accurate with about 84% correct 
prediction. This is because most of the countries in our sample were having a fixed exchange rate 
regime for that year (48 out of 87 countries).  
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However in the model of 1995, only two explanatory variables are significant—inflation rate and 
the country’s economic size, although the percentage of correct prediction is even higher than the 
model of 1990. The problem may be from the sharp change of exchange rate regimes in many 
countries—there are 11 more floaters, compared with 1990. Though the trend in recent two or 
three decades is to float the currencies, the quality of exchange rate classification is still under 
suspicion. Many countries report that they adopt the flexible choice, but actually some of them 
still peg their currencies to a foreign currency or to a basket of currencies (e.g. China stated that 
it had adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime; and this pronouncement was adopted by 
the IMF. But actually it pegged its currency to the US dollar).  
 
In the model of 2000, more coefficients of those explanatory variables, namely economic size, 
trade diversity and money market development, become significant. The distribution between 
two possible exchange rate choices is quite even, 49 to 38. More importantly, all the three 
significant variables are also have statistical meaning in the model of 1990. This repetition 
arouses our interest. Though the importance of all those explanatory variables changes from year 
to year, some of them remain crucial in the determination of choosing a preferable exchange 
arrangement.  
 
Figures 3.2 to 3.4 depict the predicted and actual exchange rare regime choices for all countries 
in three different years12. If we set 0.5 as the cut-off point, the percentages of correct prediction 
are 74.71%, 75.86% and 66.67% respectively. More accurately, the correct percentages of fixed 
choice are 83.67%, 70.27% and 71.43%, while 63.16%, 80.00% and 60.53% for the flexible 
                                                
12 Refer to Appendix C for all precise predictions for all countries in three years. 
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choice. Those rhombic markers stand for correct predictions, and those markers in square means 
incorrect predictions. 
 
Figure 3.1 Prediction Evaluation (1990)
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Figure 3.2 Prediction Evaluation (1995)
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Figure 3.4 Prediction Evaluation (2000) 
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Table 3.5   Prediction Comparison 
       
1990 1995 2000 Country Name 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Argentina 0.7754 1 0.6804 0 0.8418 0 
Bangladesh 0.6105 0 0.4256 0 0.6578 0 
Bolivia 0.6831 1 0.3836 1 0.44 0 
China,P.R.: Mainland 0.4577 0 0.8573 0 0.5871 0 
Denmark 0.4999 0 0.6105 0 0.7945 0 
Ecuador 0.5167 1 0.8767 1 0.6273 0 
Egypt 0.1886 1 0.6019 1 0.6835 0 
Ghana 0.5389 1 0.7737 1 0.3237 1 
Honduras 0.3465 1 0.5386 1 0.1737 0 
India 0.799 1 0.7009 0 0.8709 1 
Iran, I.R. of 0.7591 0 0.8856 1 0.6913 0 
Israel 0.7134 0 0.7009 1 0.5026 0 
Jamaica 0.3328 1 0.8727 1 0.2667 1 
Madagascar 0.3085 1 0.5943 1 0.398 1 
Malawi 0.2872 0 0.809 1 0.3628 1 
Maldives 0.1739 1 0.2949 1 0.1218 0 
Mauritius 0.2607 0 0.4497 1 0.2419 1 
Mozambique 0.1267 1 0.8815 1 0.3376 1 
Myanmar 0.3955 0 0.7814 0 0.8576 0 
New Zealand 0.254 1 0.4921 1 0.4808 1 
Rwanda 0.2598 0 0.3696 1 0.2524 1 
Sri Lanka 0.366 1 0.5383 1 0.5414 1 
Switzerland 0.2266 1 0.6737 1 0.4523 1 
Thailand 0.8052 0 0.717 0 0.4978 1 
Tunisia 0.2713 1 0.518 1 0.4648 1 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 0.9048 1 0.958 0 0.0178 0 
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However, those predicted values near the cut-off point are not instructive. Thus cautions should 
be paid to do the evaluation. Table 3.5 reports the results of all wrong predictions with more than 
10% deviation from 0.5. For instance, if a country chooses a flexible arrangement and the 
prediction is below 0.4, then it will be displayed in bold; if a country chooses a fixed 
arrangement and the prediction is above 0.6, then it will be also displayed in bold. Among all 87 
countries, 15 of them have only one wrong prediction, and 11 of them have two wrong 
predictions, no country has three wrong predictions. So in all 261 predictions (87 countries for 
three years), only 37 of them are incorrect (less than 15%), based on a less strict criterion. This 
again certifies the fitness of the model. 
 
Let’s pay attention to some typical countries. The predicted probabilities of choosing a flexible 
exchange rate in Argentina are consistently high, 0.77, 0.68 and 0.84. But due to high national 
foreign debts and the loss of confidence in the government, opposite to our predictions, the 
authority chose a currency board system to control the high inflation. However, with pegging to 
a hard currency—US dollar, the competitiveness of traded goods is deteriorated greatly. Actually 
its largest trade partner is not USA, instead it is Brazil, which has a flexible exchange regime. 
Though the choice of currency board system worked well in the first few years, the continuous 
appreciation of US dollar in the past few years made the balance of payments unsustainable for 
Argentina, while the capital inflow slowed down. We may find that our model suggests the 
country is even more likely to choose a floating system in 2000, 0.84 is a quite high probability. 
The incorrect choice of the exchange arrangement finally made the economy collapsed in 2001. 
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Another valuable example is Thailand. With large amount of capital inflows to the country in the 
early 1990s, the Thai Baht had great pressure of appreciation, so the authority changed the price 
of Baht imprudently. However, under a non-flexible exchange rate regime, no prophet can adjust 
the exchange rate correctly to reflect such pressure. Given the obligation to maintain its fixed 
exchange rate, the sudden shift of capital inflows to outflows quickly depleted money authority’s 
foreign reserve and the interest soon rocketed to an unsustainable level. However, predictions 
from the model (0.80 and 0.71 for 1990 and 1995 respectively) suggest that Thailand should 
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3.6. Conclusions and Suggestions in the Case of China  
 
Summarizing the models for all three years, we can find that all those economic characteristics 
have the right direction in the determination of an exchange arrangement as our theoretical 
suggestion. The following characteristics tend to be associated with a flexible exchange 
arrangement: (1) a higher inflation level, (2) a larger economic size, (3) greater capital mobility, 
(4) a diversified trade pattern, (5) relatively lower international reserve and (6) a more developed 
domestic money market. The effect of a country’s openness is undecided. And three most 
important determinants are economic size, trade diversity and domestic money market 
development.  
 
However, if we examine all three years, the Logit model fits the year 1990 best, with more 
significant coefficients, highest R-Square and high correct prediction percentage. But we also 
find that all variables have different importance in different years. One significant variable in this 
year may not be significant in another year. This inconsistency suggests that the economic 
characteristic choice mechanism of exchange rate regimes may evolve by time, or sudden 
external shocks may disturb this mechanism, e.g. after the Asian financial crisis, many countries 
float their currencies without big change of those economic characteristics. In studies by Heller 
(1978) and Holden et al (1979), only one specific year of exchange arrangement was examined. 
Thus, from this aspect, their conclusions on the importance of some characteristics are not robust. 
 
When applying the model to the case of China, we get some interesting results. From Table 3.5, 
we find the suggested probabilities for China to choose a flexible exchange rate are 0.4577, 
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0.8573 and 0.5871 in three different years. However, China’s currency, renminbi, was pegged to 
US dollars within the time span we covered, though it announced its regime to be a managed 
floating. Compared with the average, China relatively has a high inflation level, a large 
economic size, a diversified trade pattern (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 Economic Characteristics Comparison Between China and World Average1 
         
Year Country CPI GDP2 OPEN3 FA DIV IR MM 
World Average 5.124 9.397 0.534 0.757 0.276 0.308 4.642 1990 
China 11.838 12.857 0.301 0.117 0.331 0.540 2.093 
World Average 0.960 9.599 0.591 0.863 0.282 0.365 5.118 1995 
China 15.515 13.460 0.401 0.289 0.214 0.589 2.631 
World Average 0.715 9.668 0.664 1.030 0.282 0.437 5.637 2000 
China 0.205 13.892 0.440 0.286 0.178 0.759 2.493 
Data Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF, 2003. 
Note: 1. Compared with world average, all characteristics in favor of China to choose a 
flexible regime are displayed in bold. 
          2. The figure of GDP is in the natural logarithm form. 
          3. The effect of openness is undecided. 
 
 
Based on our results, in the past China incorrectly chose the exchange rate regime. Then how 
about the future? Will these determinants change to the opposite side to be in favor of a fixed 
arrangement? Except CPI, all other three favorable variables (GDP, DIV and MM) will move on 
their current tracks—a larger economic size, a more diversified trade pattern and a more 
developed money market. Generally, like many other developing countries, China had a long 
record of high inflation level. But recently the country experienced deflation rather than inflation, 
though it is mainly because the whole world is in a very stable price situation. Based on the 
conclusion from last paper—opening the capital account in China is likely to be the trend, China 
will be more integrated with the world economy, thus China’s foreign assets will increase 
dramatically. This means the effect of FA on the exchange rate determination will be obvious in 
China. Furthermore, when the capital control is loosened, the authorities will be more likely to 
have the strength to maintain a fixed regime in a big country, like China. As we argued before, 
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the international reserve to import ratio partly reflects the result of a certain regime, and it has 
been proved by the model to be not important in making the exchange rate choice decision. At 
least the reserve will not impair the government’s resolution toward a floating regime, if it 
decides to do so. All analyses above support the idea of having a more flexible exchange rate 























4.1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Predictably, with the opening of a country’s capital account, capital inflows and outflows will be 
greatly speeded up. The high capital flow will not only fluctuate the exchange rate, but can affect 
the efficiency of monetary policy at the same time. It is generally believed that the problem of 
currency substitution is one of the side-effects in the economic liberalization, though economists 
still have some difficulties in reaching agreement on a precise definition of currency substitution. 
Cuddington (1983) uses this concept to refer primarily to the switching between foreign and 
domestic currency. He uses the term ‘capital mobility’ to refer to transfers between domestic and 
foreign interest-bearing assets. McKinnon (1985) emphasizes on the distinction between direct 
and indirect currency substitution13.  Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994) extend the definition of 
currency substitution by making a distinction between ‘currency substitution’ and ‘currency 
substitutability’. According to them, currency substitution is the completed replacement of one 
currency by another, for instance, in Panama and Ecuador. Currency substitutability is the 
process by which one currency becomes a substitute for another, but does not fully replace it, 
like the situations in Latin America and Eastern Europe. To make problem simple and empirical 
                                                
13 According to McKinnon’s definition, direct currency substitution stands for the direct switch between domestic 
money and foreign money, or between domestic bonds and foreign bonds only because of their different opportunity 
costs and default risks. Indirect currency substitution occurs by the following mechanism: the change of domestic 
(foreign) currency denominated financial assets causes the interest rate differential changes, this will cause the 
movement of expected exchange rate, and finally stimulates individuals to change their holding of domestic (foreign) 
assets. However, we cannot deny why these two processes cannot happen simultaneously. See more detailed 
explanation by Mizen and Pentecost (1996). 
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testing possible, in our study, we’ll restrict the concept of currency substitution to the basic 
idea—the foreign (domestic) currency held by domestic (foreign) residents. 
 
Most previous empirical research on currency substitution focuses on two types of situations: 
one is in industrial countries, like among European countries (Artis, 1996), or between Canada 
and United States (Rogers, 1996). Another one is in developing countries, like the dollarization 
in Latin American countries (Savastano, 1996) and Eastern European countries (Brand, 1993). 
 
Mizen and Pentecost (1994) implements the cointegration and error correction method to test the 
existence of currency substitution between sterling and European Commission countries’ 
currency. Two different types of models, the money service approach and portfolio balance 
approach, have been used in their study. Their results demonstrate that there is no clear evidence 
of currency substitution in either the short or the long run between sterling and European 
currencies. 
 
Prock et al (2003) investigate the extent of currency substitution in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
using a vector error correction model. They conclude that currency substitution occurs to a 
greater extent in Argentina and Brazil than Mexico.  
 
Up till now, few studies of the currency substitution in China have been done. Jiang (1999) 
estimates the percentage of currency substitution in China is about 5-6 percent. Thus he 
concludes the problem of currency substitution is not severe. Chan (2002) estimates the amount 
of Hong Kong dollar circulating in the Guangdong Province of China is reckoned to be 7.4 
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percent of the total amount issued in Hong Kong. And the demand function suggests the foreign 
currency held by Chinese residents is mainly for transaction purpose. Thus the impact on the 
exchange rate is minimal.  
  
The purpose of this chapter is to test whether the problem of currency substitution exists in China. 
As it will influence domestic monetary policy when a country is more open to world markets, it 
is worth to be studied before China opens its capital account. Following Mizen and Pentecost 
(1994), we will also use the cointegration and error correction method to test the existence of 
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4.2. Currency Substitution Theory and Econometric Methodology 
 
There are two major approaches in modeling the existence of currency substitution. One is the 
money service approach, which has been developed by Miles (1978); the second one is the 
portfolio balance approach due to Cuddington (1983). Based on different intrinsic economic 
theories, these two models have different specifications in the money demand function. In order 
to get a more objective result, both of them will be studied in this chapter. 
 
a) Money Services Approach 
 
According to the money services approach, individuals make their decision on the combination 
of different assets by a two-stage process. At the first stage, they divide their wealth between 
money and other assets (like bonds). Then switch between different types of monies (or bonds) 
in the second stage. Under this hypothesis, apparently the currency substitution will only happen 
in the second stage. In this stage, different monies are entered into a production function for 
money service, where the amount of each type of money held by individuals will continue to 
increase until the marginal benefit equals to its rental cost, measured by the associated rate of 
interest. This approach emphasizes money’s transaction role as a medium of exchange. The 
mechanism can be expressed by some more formal equations. 
 
(4.1)             *** ),(),( YrrkPYrrkPMMM FDFD +=+=   
 
(4.2)             ********** ),(),( YrrkPYrrkPMMM FDFD +=+=  
 
- 75 - 
where M and M* are two currencies, D and F denote domestic and foreign respectively, P is the 
price level, r is the nominal interest rate, k is the reciprocal of the velocity of circulation, Y is the 
level of real income, and asterisks denote the foreign currency counterparts.  
 
In the simplest form, if we assume that domestic residents hold no foreign currency, then 
0* =DM  and 0=Dk , and equation (4.1) reduces to: 
 





















The degree of currency substitution by foreign residents is given by the partial derivative of 
money demand with respect to the foreign interest rate, 
2F
k . Therefore, a rise of the foreign 
interest rate will lead foreign individuals to switch from foreign currency to domestic currency, 
as the rental cost of holding foreign currency increases. We shall notice that under the money 
service hypothesis, interest rate is more treated as the opportunity cost of holding a currency 
rather than the return on assets. 
 
In the empirical estimation, the model is specified as follow: 
 






where ut is an error term. We expect to see 01 <a , 0, 32 >aa . The degree of currency 
substitution will be measured by 2a . 
 
b) Portfolio Balance Approach 
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The portfolio balance approach takes money as an asset which is a general substitute for all other 
assets. Individuals hold different assets according to their risks and expected relative returns. We 
assume foreign residents hold four different types of assets: domestic money, M, foreign money, 
M*, domestic bond, B and foreign bond B*. If we take the exchange rate as fixed, which is the 
case in current China, then the real demand for domestic money held by foreigners has the 
following form: 
 
(4.5)                ),,,,,(/ **** YrrrrfPM BBF ππ −=  
 
(4.6)                ),,,,(/ ** YxrrrfPM BF =  
 
where x is the inflation differential, which equals *ππ − ; and π  and *π  are domestic and 
foreign inflation level respectively, and all other variables have the same definition as in the 
money service approach.  
 
If we assume only those Chinese investors holding foreign currencies will switch their portfolio 
between US dollar and US government bond, then domestic bond yield can be eliminated from 
the equation (4.5) 14  and we can get the reduced form as in equation (4.6). The inflation 
differential is also included in this model as we assume that investors tend to hold assets which 
face less inflation possibility. As the foreign exchange rate between renminbi and US dollar is 
fixed within the period that we cover, it is not considered in forming the model specification. In 
this approach, the degree of currency substitution is indicated by the coefficient on x. Any 
increase in x indicates the relatively high domestic inflation, which will probably induce people 
to hold less domestic money and more foreign money. 
                                                
14 BIS (2002) documents that between 1999 and 2001, Chinese government purchased more than $80 billion US 
government bonds as its international reserve. And there is no indication that any investors sell their foreign 
currency to buy the Chinese government bonds. 
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The empirical specification for the money demand function is as follow: 
 






We expect to see 0,, 432 <bbb  and 0, 51 >bb . The coefficient for rt is positive: the increase of 
domestic interest rate means a higher return on domestic money, consequently the demand for it 
will increase. The sign of 2b  is negative: increase in foreign interest rate means the relative 
return on foreign money increases, domestic currency becomes less attractive. People will switch 
from domestic currency to foreign currency. 3b  is negative: with the higher yield on domestic 
bonds, foreign investors are more likely to hold less domestic currency. 4b  is also negative: with 
the increase of relative inflation, people will be burdened by a heavier inflation tax if they hold 
domestic money. Especially in those countries with hyper-inflation, people are more willing to 
hold hard currencies. Thus a negative coefficient on x indicates the existence of currency 
substitution (the higher the domestic inflation, the less demand for domestic money from foreign 
individuals). Obviously, along with the increase of income, people tend to hold more money. So 
5b  is positive. 
 
In this chapter, China is treated as a foreign country and US dollars are taken as domestic 
currency15. The amount of US dollar is proxied by the total foreign currency liability in China’s 
banking system. 63 quarterly data (from 1987Q1 to 2002Q3) are used in the estimation. In the 
data selection, for money demand, foreign liability in Chinese banking industry is adopted; for 
interest rates, one-year deposit rates are used; for price levels, consumer price indices are used; 
                                                
15 In China, 80% of the foreign currency deposits are US dollar (BIS, 2002). Taking US dollar as the substitution 
currency in China will simplify the empirical modeling without distorting the real situation. 
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for bond yield, US government 10-year bond is indexed; for national income, gross domestic 
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4.3. Estimation Results 
 
In this section, the Engle-Granger-Johansen cointegration methodology is used to test the 
existence of currency substitution for both models. The long-run performance of a model can be 
determined by testing the stationarity of the residual: if the long-run equation is stable then it 
should exhibit cointegration. Of course, the Johansen cointegration test will also be applied to 
test the long-run relationship. Once the long-run equilibrium exists, the short-run dynamics can 
be determined by applying an error correction model.   
 
All variables are tested for their order of integration by Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, 
and results are reported in Table 4.1, which suggests that most of them are I(1) variables, except 
inflation differential16. 
Table 4.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Integration Tests 
 
 Variable ADF Test At Level ADF Test At First Difference 
MF/P -1.824 -7.073*** 
r -1.854 -3.879*** 
r* -0.612 -5.870*** 
Y* -1.844 -11.213*** 
π -2.222 -11.267*** 
π* -2.698* -3.559*** 
rB -2.387 -3.014** 
x -2.761* -3.531** 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes rejection of the hypothesis of non-stationarity at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the results for the money service model. The dependent variable is real 
amount of US dollar holding by Chinese individuals. The independent variables are US interest 
rate, China’s interest rate and the income of Chinese people in the natural logarithm. All the 
                                                
16 As x is denoted as the difference of two I(1) variables (π and π*), it is not surprising to find it to be an I(0) process. 
And it is only significant at 10% level. 
- 80 - 
signs of three independent variables are in line with our theoretical assumption; coefficients for 
the US interest rate and the Chinese interest rate are negative while that for income is positive. 
Furthermore, all coefficients are significant at 1% level.  
Table 4.2 OLS Estimation on Money Service Hypothesis 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 9.709 0.571 16.993 0.000 
r -0.064 0.021 -2.995 0.004 
r* 0.098 0.011 8.520 0.000 
Y* 1.230 0.052 23.436 0.000 
R-squared 0.931 Mean dependent var 21.366 
Adjusted R-squared 0.928 S.D. dependent var 0.863 
S.E. of regression 0.232 Akaike info criterion -0.027 
Sum squared resid 3.163 Schwarz criterion 0.109 
Log likelihood 4.841 F-statistic 267.394 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.557 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
 
The ADF test for the residual suggests that it is an I(0) variable at 10% level ( the ADF statistic 
is -2.874), which means these four variables can form a cointegration vector. And Johansen 
cointegration test is also applied to evaluate whether a linear combination of these four non-
stationary variables form a stationary, cointegration vector. Results are reported in Table 4.3. 
Trace test and max-eigenvalue test indicate that there is one cointegration equation at the 5% 
level. The coefficient for variable r* is 0.098, which means the Chinese residents’ demand on US 
dollar will increase by 9.8% when the interest rate of US dollar increases by one percent. This 
suggests a strong currency substitution in China. 
 
As both ADF test and Johansen test suggest one cointegration vector for four variables in the 
money service hypothesis model, an error correction model is needed to evaluate the short-run 
dynamics of the currency substitution. In error correction model, the dependent variable is the 
first difference of real US dollar demand in China, ∆(MF/P). The independent variables are the 
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residuals from OLS estimation, lagged differences of interest rates and income. All insignificant 
lagged differences are dropped, so that the model is more parsimonious. Results are displayed in 
Table 4.4. Except for the constant, all other remaining variables are significant at 5% level. And 
the most important sign, the sign of the residual, is significantly negative, which indicates the 
existence of feedback mechanism. The only flaw is the low R2 value. However, judging from the 
cointegration test and error correction model, we can conclude that the currency substitution 
exists in China. 
Table 4.3 Johansen Cointegration Test on MF/P, r, r*, Y* 
     
Hypothesized  Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None * 0.412 51.907 47.21 54.46 
At most 1 0.186 19.998 29.68 35.65 
At most 2 0.098 7.613 15.41 20.04 
At most 3 0.024 1.451 3.76 6.65 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None * 0.412 31.909 27.07 32.24 
At most 1 0.186 12.384 20.97 25.52 
At most 2 0.098 6.163 14.07 18.63 
At most 3 0.024 1.451 3.76 6.65 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level. 
 
Table 4.4 Error Correction Model for Money Service Hypothesis 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.022 0.014 1.605 0.114 
ut-1 -0.136 0.065 -2.093 0.041 
∆rt 0.087 0.035 2.447 0.018 
∆rt-1 -0.073 0.037 -1.983 0.052 
∆Y*t 0.277 0.125 2.219 0.031 
R-squared 0.215 Mean dependent var 0.031 
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 S.D. dependent var 0.111 
S.E. of regression 0.102 Akaike info criterion -1.647 
Sum squared resid 0.584 Schwarz criterion -1.474 
Log likelihood 55.245 F-statistic 3.828 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.627 Prob(F-statistic) 0.008 
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A similar estimation process is also implemented for the portfolio balance hypothesis. Table 4.5, 
4.6 and 4.7 summarize the empirical results. They provide us with a similar conclusion. In the 
initial OLS estimation, not all five explanatory variables (r, r*, rB, x, Y*) are statistically 
significant. However, the coefficient on x is still significant on 10% level. And the signs of three 
coefficients are in line with our theoretical predictions, with the exceptions of r and r*. The ADF 
test of the residual from OLS estimation17 indicates these six variables (plus money demand) are 
cointegrated. Furthermore, the Johansen cointegration test certifies that there is one cointegration 
vector (see Table 4.6). Like in the money service approach, after finding the long-run 
relationship of those variables, short-run dynamics is also estimated by an error correction model. 
From Table 4.7, we know that not all lagged differences are statistically significant. But the most 
critical variable, vt has a significant coefficient with a correct negative sign. This proves that any 
deviation from the long run equilibrium will be corrected. Thus generally, currency substitution 
between renminbi and US dollar is again supported by the second approach. 
Table 4.5 OLS Estimation on Portfolio Balance Hypothesis 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 9.702 0.578 16.780 0.000 
r -0.064 0.021 -2.973 0.004 
r* 0.099 0.016 6.236 0.000 
rB -0.052 0.037 -1.412 0.163 
x -0.034 0.020 -1.713 0.092 
Y* 1.230 0.053 23.235 0.000 
R-squared 0.932 Mean dependent var 21.366 
Adjusted R-squared 0.927 S.D. dependent var 0.863 
S.E. of regression 0.233 Akaike info criterion 0.005 
Sum squared resid 3.162 Schwarz criterion 0.175 
Log likelihood 4.853 F-statistic 197.227 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.558 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
 
 
                                                
17 The ADF statistic of the residual is -2.880, significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4.6 Johansen Cointegration Test on MF/P, r, r*, rB, x, Y* 
     
Hypothesized   Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None ** 0.501 91.471 68.52 76.07 
At most 1 * 0.344 49.744 47.21 54.46 
At most 2 0.233 24.412 29.68 35.65 
At most 3 0.109 8.522 15.41 20.04 
Hypothesized   Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None ** 0.501 41.727 33.46 38.77 
At most 1 0.344 25.332 27.07 32.24 
At most 2 0.233 15.891 20.97 25.52 
At most 3 0.109 6.921 14.07 18.63 
Notes: ** and * denote rejection of the hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% and 
the 5% level respectively. 
 
Table 4.7 Error Correction Model for Portfolio Balance Hypothesis 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
vt-1 -0.186 0.072 -2.593 0.012 
∆rt 0.072 0.037 1.968 0.054 
∆rt-1 -0.062 0.038 -1.625 0.110 
∆r*t-1 -0.029 0.020 -1.450 0.153 
∆xt-1 0.035 0.022 1.583 0.119 
∆Y*t 0.372 0.121 3.077 0.003 
R-squared 0.218     Mean dependent var 0.031 
Adjusted R-squared 0.146     S.D. dependent var 0.111 
S.E. of regression 0.103     Akaike info criterion -1.618 
Sum squared resid 0.582     Schwarz criterion -1.411 
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4.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Using cointegration and error correction methodology, we find that the problem of asymmetric 
currency substitution18 between renminbi and US dollar exists in China. This finding contradicts 
with Jiang’s (1999) argument that currency substitution in China is minimal, and it will only 
happen after the full opening of China’s capital account. The implication of our finding is that 
even without the capital account liberalization, currency substitution exists. However, as the 
percentage of foreign currency to domestic deposits is still very low, less than 10%, this will not 
influence the central bank’s monetary policy. But from a policymaking perspective, it is 
important to consider that the greater the degree of currency substitution, the more sensitive a 
country’s monetary aggregates are to sudden movements in exchange rates, productivity and 
interest rates. Given the conditions of a liberalized capital account associated with flexible 
exchange rate arrangement, currency substitution will magnify any external shocks. Thus a more 









                                                
18 This means Chinese residents may switch to hold US dollar from renminbi, but not in reverse. 




In this thesis, three closely related issues of capital account liberalization in China have been 
studied. They are the order of capital account liberalization, the choice of an appropriate 
exchange rate regime and one possible side-effect of the liberalization—currency substitution.  
 
As open market can allocate capital more efficiently and thus enhances the productivity, the 
process toward a fully liberalized capital account in China is likely to be the trend. The critical 
problem is to properly sequence the liberalization process. Following McKinnon’s (1993) theory, 
a set of macroeconomic variables on China is compared with those on other similar developing 
countries. The capital accounts of these countries are either open or were once open. From three 
different aspects, government finance, domestic money market and capital market and the 
foreign related economy, we conclude that it is still not advisable for China to take the final 
step—to liberalize the capital account. Many economic reforms or improvements need to be 
implemented before making this policy change: government’s fiscal control should be 
strengthened; a market oriented interest rate determination mechanism needs to be established; 
and China should liberalize its capital account only when it has reached a certain level of trade 
maturity.  
 
A Logit model is used to estimate the determination process on the choice of an appropriate 
exchange rate regime. Regressions using data on 87 countries, including China, are performed 
for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000. Seven economic characteristics, namely inflation level, size 
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of the economy, degree of economic openness, capital mobility, trade diversity, international 
reserve and domestic money market development are included as explanatory variables in the 
estimation. Six of them are found to be deterministic on choosing the exchange rate regime. The 
empirical prediction suggests China’s current fixed foreign exchange arrangement is not 
compatible with its macroeconomic variables. This supports our policy proposal of a flexible 
exchange rate regime to China.  
 
In chapter four, the issue of currency substitution is being examined. Money service approach 
and portfolio balance approach are tested by the cointegration and error correction methodology. 
Both of them indicate the existence of currency substitution in China, though the country hasn’t 
fully opened its economy yet. The policy implication is that as currency substitution will 
magnify any external shocks in an open economy, a more cautious liberalization process should 
be taken in China. This possible side-effect of economic liberalization should be highlighted 
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Appendix A: 
 
Key Events in the Liberalization Process of Selected Countries 
 
Argentina:  Multiple exchange-rate system unified between 1976 and 1978. Foreign loans at 
market exchange rates permitted in 1978. Controls on inward and outward capital 
flows loosened in 1977. Liberalization measures reversed in 1982. Capital and 
exchange controls eliminated in 1991. Currency Board System was implemented 
in April 1991—Peso pegged to US dollar. It worked well for 7 years with low 
inflation and high growth before 1997. However, the credibility was doubtful 
after 1997’s Asian crisis, and the system broke down in 2002. 
 
Brazil:          System of comprehensive foreign-exchange controls abolished in 1984. Most 
capital outflows restricted in the 1980s. Controls on capital inflows strengthened 
and controls on outflows loosened in the 1990s. 
 
Chile:     Capital control gradually eased since 1979. Controls re-imposed in 1982 and 
eased again in mid-1980s. Foreign direct and portfolio investment are subject to a 
one-year minimum holding period. Foreign loans subject to a 30% reserve 
requirement. 
 
Mexico:  Government gave discretion over foreign direct investment in 1972. Ambiguous 
restrictions on foreign direct investment rationalized in 1989. Portfolio flows 
decontrolled further in 1989. 
 
Peru:      Capital controls removed in December 1990. 
 
Korea:    Controls on foreign borrowing under US$200,000 with maturities of less than 
three years eased in 1979. Restriction on foreign borrowing under US$1 million 
eased in 1982. Controls on outward and inward foreign investment gradually 
eased since 1985. Significant restrictions on inward investment were in place until 
1998. 
 
Malaysia: Capital account mostly liberalized in the 1970s. Inward foreign direct and 
portfolio investment deregulated further in the mid-1980s. Controls on short-term 
and portfolio inflows temporarily re-imposed in 1994. Malaysian Ringgit pegger 
to US dollar at the rate of 3.8 per dollar, and more restricted capital controls were 
introduced after the financial crisis in 1997. 
 
Philippines:  Foreign exchange and investment channeled through the government in the 1970s. 
Inter-bank foreign-exchange trading limited to thirty minutes per day after 1983. 
Off-floor trading introduced in 1992. Restrictions on all current and most capital 
transactions eliminated over 1992-1995. 
 
Singapore:  Government freed exchange and capital controls by 1978. 
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Thailand:  Restrictions on inward long-term investment eased in the mid-1980s. Controls on 
short-term flows and outward investment eased in the 1990s. The reserve 
requirement on short-term foreign borrowing is 7%. Currency controls introduced 
in May and June of 1997 to deter currency speculators. Limits on foreign 
ownership of domestic financial institutions relaxed in October 1997. 
 
Note: Most contents are reproduced from ‘A Survey of Financial Liberalization’, John 
Williamson and Molly Mahar, Essays in International Finance, Princeton University, 
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Appendix B: 
 
A Brief Introduction to China’s Tax System 
 
According to annals of history, China's tax system dates back to ancient times. Nevertheless, 
the system in modern China not as yet comprehensive, tax laws remain incomplete, the means 
of tax collection are backward, and the overall system is in urgent need of reform. 
 
Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China has continuously used single 
tax system to carry out the functions to taxation management. The profits from state-owned 
enterprises were the government’s major revenue. However 1980, in compliance with the 
requirements of the market orientation, China began to explore ways to conduct financial and 
taxation reform based on the division of income and expenditures and their respective budgets. 
Since 1984, the country has gradually established a multiple tax system based mainly on the 
turnover and income taxes, which have been coordinated with other reforming the industrial 
and commercial tax system. The effort has basically met the needs of economic development 
and economic structural reform. Effective January 1, 1994, China radically reformed its 
industrial and commercial tax system. Six tax regulations, including the value added tax (VAT), 
consumption tax, business tax, enterprise income tax, resource tax and land VAT, were 
implemented simultaneously with the revised Individual Income Tax law. 
 
The publication and implementation of the new laws and regulations indicate that the recent tax 
system reform is not simply a patchwork effort or reform of individual tax categories, but rather 
represents the comprehensive structural reform of the country's tax system. The goal of the new 
laws is to establish an overall tax system which conforms to national conditions and generally 
accepted international practices, while at same time reflecting the requirements of the market 
economy, and facilitating macro control and economic development. 
 
Tax system reforms conducted in line with the principle of the combination of the planned 
economy and market regulation have all along been characterized by a tendency towards the 
excessive use of the tax system to interfere with market mechanisms. With more in-depth 
economic reform in all areas and a more opened economy, the multiple tax system, which has 
been characterized by multiple tax categories with multiple levels and multiple taxations, 
obviously no longer suits the needs of the further development of a market economy. It has thus 
been quite difficult to allow the system to play its proper regulatory role in handling and 
distributive relationship between the central and local governments. The major defects have 
manifested themselves as follows: 
 
1.  The irrational structure of the tax system and the unfair tax burden. For example, enterprise 
income taxes have been determined in accordance with the differing nature of ownership. 
Failure to merge the multiple tax system and readjust tax rates is thus disadvantageous to fair 
competition among enterprises. 
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2.  The distributive relationship between the state and enterprises is in a disproportionate 
interlocking state. In addition to enterprise income and regulatory taxes, the state also collects 
construction and budgetary buffer funds from enterprises engaged in key energy and 
communications projects. Competent departments of local governments also overburden 
enterprises as a whole by using various methods to collect considerable administrative expenses 
and funds.  
 
3.  The irrational division of tax income and management power over taxation is 
disadvantageous to the thorough implementation of the system of sharing tax revenues between 
the central and local authorities. For the major tax revenue, VAT, the central government 
collects 75%. 
 
4.  The scope and extent of taxation control fails to meet and demand for allowing production 
factors to completely enter the market. Tax regulations covering the real estate and capital 
markets are far from being in place. 
 
5.  Implementation of two separate tax systems for domestically funded and foreign-funded 
enterprises has led to increasingly sharp contradiction. Foreign enterprises pay much lower 
taxes than domestic enterprises. 
 
6. The obsolete methods of tax collection and management have resulted in serious losses of 
tax revenue. Estimates based on a survey reveal that the total amount of tax revenues lost 
annually in China is around 50 billion yuan. 
 
The aforementioned problems show that further deepening reform of the tax system is both 
necessary and urgent. 
 
Below some basic tax forms in China are listed. 
 
1. Value-Added Tax 
The tax rate is 17% for sales or import of goods by tax payers except some special industries 
which are taxed on 13%. Export goods, except those specially prescribed by the State Council, 
are exempted from VAT.  
 
2. Income Tax on Enterprises 
The basic income tax rate on enterprises is 33% on the basis of the profits earned during 
production and operation of enterprises. However, in special economic zones, foreign-funded 
enterprises can enjoy a favorable tax rate at 15%, together with many other exemptions.  
 
3. Individual Income Tax 
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It is calculated on the basis of balance of monthly income after deducting expenses of 800 yuan. 













































- 95 - 
Appendix C:  
 
 
Exchange Rate Regime Choices for All Sample Countries (1) 
 
1990 1995 2000 Country Name 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Algeria 0.3928 0 0.8363 1 0.6994 1 
Argentina 0.7754 1 0.6804 0 0.8418 0 
Australia 0.7428 1 0.6208 1 0.8000 1 
Bahamas, The 0.4866 0 0.2720 0 0.0139 0 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 0.4617 0 0.5407 0 0.1078 0 
Bangladesh 0.6105 0 0.4256 0 0.6578 0 
Barbados 0.0983 0 0.2151 0 0.1687 0 
Belize 0.1865 0 0.1799 0 0.0622 0 
Bolivia 0.6831 1 0.3836 1 0.4400 0 
Burkina Faso 0.2285 0 0.2381 0 0.3516 0 
Cameroon 0.5840 0 0.3918 0 0.5704 0 
Canada 0.9629 1 0.7323 1 0.4303 1 
Central African Rep. 0.1639 0 0.2277 0 0.1414 0 
Chile 0.8919 1 0.6680 1 0.7413 1 
China,P.R.: Mainland 0.4577 0 0.8573 0 0.5871 0 
Colombia 0.7923 1 0.7976 1 0.6401 1 
Costa Rica 0.4840 1 0.6025 1 0.3088 0 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.4063 0 0.5328 0 0.5762 0 
Cyprus 0.1182 0 0.3798 0 0.2467 0 
Denmark 0.4999 0 0.6105 0 0.7945 0 
Dominica 0.0270 0 0.1311 0 0.0592 0 
Ecuador 0.5167 1 0.8767 1 0.6273 0 
Egypt 0.1886 1 0.6019 1 0.6835 0 
El Salvador 0.4453 1 0.4654 1 0.4267 0 
Ethiopia 0.2064 0 0.3093 1 0.4167 1 
Fiji 0.1776 0 0.2857 0 0.1992 0 
Gabon 0.4057 0 0.4218 0 0.2564 0 
Ghana 0.5389 1 0.7737 1 0.3237 1 
Grenada 0.0169 0 0.1206 0 0.0486 0 
Guatemala 0.4780 1 0.4607 1 0.4828 1 
Honduras 0.3465 1 0.5386 1 0.1737 0 




To be continued 




Exchange Rate Regime Choices for All Sample Countries (2) 
 
1990 1995 2000 Country Name 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Iceland 0.3988 0 0.3159 0 0.5161 1 
India 0.7990 1 0.7009 0 0.8709 1 
Indonesia 0.8244 1 0.7040 1 0.7548 1 
Iran, I.R. of 0.7591 0 0.8856 1 0.6913 0 
Israel 0.7134 0 0.7009 1 0.5026 0 
Jamaica 0.3328 1 0.8727 1 0.2667 1 
Japan 0.6153 1 0.7774 1 0.8197 1 
Jordan 0.0074 0 0.4087 0 0.2414 0 
Kenya 0.3258 0 0.7189 1 0.5524 1 
Korea 0.9062 1 0.7541 1 0.7763 1 
Madagascar 0.3085 1 0.5943 1 0.3980 1 
Malawi 0.2872 0 0.8090 1 0.3628 1 
Malaysia 0.5248 0 0.8634 1 0.5042 0 
Maldives 0.1739 1 0.2949 1 0.1218 0 
Mali 0.3015 0 0.2938 0 0.1954 0 
Malta 0.0053 0 0.5585 0 0.0537 0 
Mauritius 0.2607 0 0.4497 1 0.2419 1 
Mexico 0.9751 1 0.8451 1 0.5518 1 
Morocco 0.2823 0 0.4733 0 0.3887 0 
Mozambique 0.1267 1 0.8815 1 0.3376 1 
Myanmar 0.3955 0 0.7814 0 0.8576 0 
Nepal 0.2115 0 0.3510 0 0.2197 0 
New Zealand 0.2540 1 0.4921 1 0.4808 1 
Nicaragua 0.7002 1 0.4967 1 0.1767 0 
Niger 0.2788 0 0.2681 0 0.3524 0 
Nigeria 0.6047 1 0.9745 0 0.7205 1 
Norway 0.3819 0 0.5940 1 0.8017 1 
Pakistan 0.4667 1 0.6036 1 0.7153 1 
Panama 0.4174 0 0.2703 0 0.1813 0 
Paraguay 0.5639 1 0.5562 1 0.4008 1 
Peru 0.7922 1 0.9019 1 0.7016 1 




To be continued 




Exchange Rate Regime Choices for All Sample Countries (3) 
 
1990 1995 2000 Country Name 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Poland 0.5386 0 0.9269 1 0.7445 1 
Qatar 0.1309 0 0.4227 0 0.4630 0 
Rwanda 0.2598 0 0.3696 1 0.2524 1 
Senegal 0.4386 0 0.3521 0 0.4516 0 
Seychelles 0.0442 0 0.1451 0 0.0800 0 
Singapore 0.8072 1 0.9646 1 0.5160 1 
South Africa 0.5550 1 0.6849 1 0.7803 1 
Sri Lanka 0.3660 1 0.5383 1 0.5414 1 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.0237 0 0.1223 0 0.0149 0 
St. Lucia 0.0626 0 0.1962 0 0.0562 0 
St. Vincent & Grens. 0.0490 0 0.1431 0 0.0494 0 
Sudan 0.1301 0 0.9994 1 0.5413 1 
Suriname 0.0105 0 1.0000 1 0.0222 0 
Switzerland 0.2266 1 0.6737 1 0.4523 1 
Thailand 0.8052 0 0.7170 0 0.4978 1 
Togo 0.1299 0 0.4287 0 0.3225 0 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.5136 0 0.4569 1 0.2017 0 
Tunisia 0.2713 1 0.5180 1 0.4648 1 
Turkey 0.8930 1 0.9970 1 0.8333 1 
United States 0.9435 1 0.8271 1 0.9818 1 
Uruguay 0.8691 1 0.9397 1 0.5224 0 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 0.9048 1 0.9580 0 0.0178 0 
Zimbabwe 0.4059 0 0.7664 1 0.3544 0 
 
